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INTRODUCTION
The persistence of housing segregation in the face of legal and
other societal efforts to promote integration has been the subject of
intense academic debate and scholarship. Most of the "early"
scholarship' focused on the efficacy of the Fair Housing Act of
1968 and subsequent amendments.2 Much of the recent scholar-
ship has focused on the failure of the Fair Housing Act to address
the problem and the persistence of, indeed the increase in, residen-
tial segregation in the United States over the last twenty years.
3
Although there are many theories explaining the persistence of
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ISee, e.g., THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTERTwENTY YEARS (Robert G. Schwemm ed.,
1989) (examining the effectiveness of the Fair Housing Act of 1968); GEORGE R.
METCALF, FAIR HOUSING COMES OF AGE (1988) (assessing the results of fair housing
activities and calling for more governmental support for fair housing); Jean E.
Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149
(1969) (commenting on the legislative history of the newly passed Fair Housing Act);
Arthur S. Flemming, The Politics of Fair Housing, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 385, 386
(1988) (remarking that the Fair Housing Act "did not have the teeth it required if we
were really going to deal with the issue of fair housing in a meaningful and effective
way"); Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Elizabeth Trosman, Affirmative Action and the
American Dream: ImplementingFairHousing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs,
74 Nw. U. L. REv. 491, 521-78 (1979) (discussing the legal obligations arising under
the affirmative action standard of the Fair Housing Act); Robert G. Schwemm, Private
Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 375, 375 (1988) (posing
the question, "[i]f the United States has been officially committed to providing for fair
housing for the past 20 years, why is segregated housing still the prevailing norm
throughout our nation?"); Richard H. Sander, Comment, Individual Rights and
Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 874, 880-83
(1988) (describing the federal government's assault on housing discrimination via the
Fair Housing Act as well as court decisions, but finding that each has had a minimal
impact on racial segregation).
2 Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
s See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 186-216 (1993) (discussing the
failure of the Fair Housing Act to eliminate residential segregation). American
Apartheid is arguably the definitive work in this area of scholarship.
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residential racial segregation in contemporary American society,
there is agreement that this problem has not improved4 since
integration was adopted as a philosophy in the landmark case of
Brown v. Board of Education.5
Although an exhaustive analysis of the reasons for the increase
in residential segregation is outside the scope of this Article, it is
beyond peradventure that racism and poverty are identified as two
factors that contribute to the continuing existence of hypersegrega-
tion.6 Hypersegregation results in the creation of ghettos7 and
other similarly designated neighborhoods in which the vast majority
of urban Blacks' live. This Article explores the interaction between
4 See id. at 195-200.
5 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). I make the uncontroversial assertion that Brown
I represented the end of one era in race relations, dejure segregation in education,
and adopted an integrationist philosophy and approach to education that not only
signaled the death knell of dejure segregation in education, but the philosophy of de
jure segregation in toto. Brown I began the integrationist philosophy that inevitably
led to the adoption of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the notion that segregated
residential housing patterns were and are to be lawfully and socially discouraged. For
a discussion of Brown land its historical place in American judicature, see MichaelJ.
Klarman, Brown, Racial Change and the CivilRights Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7 (1994)
(discussing the long-term inevitability of racial change and the short-term significance
of Brown 1). For a discussion of integrationism and its impact on the educational
choices available to Blacks, see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whis Tonk, and United
States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1401, 1465-68 (1993) (defending the existence of publicly financed, historically Black
colleges).
6 A study by Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton measured segregation along five
dimensions--evenness, exposure, clustering, centralization, and concentration. See
Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas:
Black and Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimensions, 26 DEMOrRAPHY 373, 374, 389
(1989). The results of this study indicated that Blacks are the only minority group
that experiences extreme segregation in all five dimensions. See id. at 374. Massey
and Denton called this condition "hypersegregation." Id. Hypersegregation results
in extreme social isolation and causes, among other things, a concentration of
poverty, labor force withdrawal, and unemployment in inner-city Black neighbor-
hoods. See id. at 389. For further discussion of this issue and a presentation of the
statistics that demonstrate the existence of hypersegregation in housing patterns, see
infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
7 For a definition of "ghetto," see infra note 25.
8 The current trend is to refer to Black Americans as Blacks. For the purposes of
this Article, I will adopt Professor Neil Gotanda's position with respect to the usage
of the terms "Black," "Negro," "African-American," and "white":
[Because] use of these words has varied historically, choosing between
"Negro" and "Black" will generally follow the context of the historical
discussion. "African-American" is used to emphasize the present necessity
of a self-conscious re-examination of the Black American race, including a
recognition of the dimensions of culture and community beyond the formal
label....
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racism and poverty and the effect this interaction has on the
consignment of Blacks to segregated, substandard housing. My
thesis, however, differs from those traditionally presented.
In Part I, I review the traditional scholarly explanations that
focus on race and poverty to explain the increase in residential
segregation. Next, I disconnect race and poverty and briefly explain
the role that racism plays in maintaining segregated communities.
This explication is based on the assumption that in a world without
racism-the ideal state of race relations in which race would be
treated no differently than eye color, and neither entitlements nor
rights would depend on it--Blacks and whites would be proportion-
ately represented in neighborhoods based on their socioeconomic
status. Implicit in this assumption is a second assumption that
Blacks would, all other things being equal, prefer to live in integrat-
The word "white" is not capitalized despite its use in this article as the
dialectical opposite of Black. The terms "white" and "Black" evolved in the
seventeenth century North American colonies as slavery evolved, but their
meanings go far beyond that historical moment. To the extent that Black
"summarizes" relations of racial subordination, white "summarizes" racial
domination. As a term describing racial domination, "white" is better left
in lower case, rather than privileged with a capital letter. "Black," on the
other hand, has deep political and social meaning as a liberating term, and,
therefore, deserves capitalization.
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 n.12
(1991).
More recently, Professor Cheryl Harris hasjoined Professor Kimberl Crenshaw
in using the term "Black": "I use the term 'Black' throughout the paper for the
reasons articulated by Professor Kimberl Crenshaw. I share her view that 'Blacks,
like Asians, Latinos, and other "minorities," constitute a specific cultural group and,
as such, require denotation as a proper noun.'" Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1710 n.3 (1993) (quoting Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988)). Nikki Giovanni states more directly:
I am a black American. Period. The rest is of no particular interest to me.
Afro-American, African American, whatever. I believe that if I remain a
black American I force all others to become and claim their other
Americanisms. They are white Americans, Irish-Americans, Jewish-
Americans, or whatever hyphens they would like to use. The' noun is
"black"; American is the adjective.
Nikki Giovanni, Black Is the Noun, in LURE AND LOATHING: ESSAYS ON RACE,
IDENTITY, AND THE AMBIVALENCE OF ASSIMILATION 113, 122 (Gerald Early ed., 1993)
[hereinafter LURE AND LOATHING].
9 See Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 586 (1977) ("Race does not function in
our culture as does eye color. Eye color is an irrelevant category; nobody cares what
color people's eyes are; it is not an important cultural fact; nothing turns on what eye
color you have.").
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ed communities with whites,"0 but are precluded from doing so
because they have historically been discriminated against and
subordinated in American society.
11
Part II analyzes the deficiencies of the "traditional" legal
approaches to the eradication of discrimination in housing and its
byproduct, segregation. In particular, I critique two competing
models-the market model and the interventionist model. Propo-
nents argue that these models can serve as vehicles to reduce or
eliminate racial discrimination in housing. The market model
decries the use of intervention or legal rules to alter discriminatory
10 The notion that Blacks would want to live in integrated communities with whites
if given a choice between equal housing in an integrated neighborhood or a
neighborhood that is predominantly or exclusively Black represents the acceptance
of integrationism as a philosophy and an ideal. Others have contended that integra-
tionism is a failed philosophy or strategy for Blacks in that it represents either a form
of assimilation that is the equivalent of painless genocide or an incorrect strategy to
achieve racial harmony in American society because it requires Blacks to interact with
whites from a position of weakness rather than strength, strength which can only be
developed through strong, and largely separate, Black enclaves or communities within
the society. See, e.g., Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE LJ. 758, 783-811
(contrasting integrationism with black nationalism). This Article proceeds on an
assumption that integrationism as a process and a goal is normatively positive for
society. See, e.g.,Johnson, supra note 5, at 1438-39 (discussing the distinction between
integration as a goal and integration as a process).
Elsewhere, in the analogous context of postsecondary education, I take the
position that although integration may be normatively positive for society and
therefore something that should be encouraged, it should be recognized and accepted
that positive benefits flow from maintaining segregated environments as long as those
segregated environments, including housing, are freely chosen by Blacks. See id. at
1437. Thus, as long as Blacks have the choice to integrate previously all or predomi-
nantly white institutions, a societal good is produced. Whether they indeed choose
to integrate is another question the answer to which is irrelevant for the issues
presented herein.
" Although the focus of the paper is on Blacks, the argument may be expanded
to other persons who are subordinated simply because they are not white. These
subordinated persons have been collectively referred to as "outsiders" because they
represent the "other" or those who are not white and therefore are not perceived to
be the norm. For a discussion of the "outsider" and other subordinated persons, see
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323-26 (1989). Professor Matsuda employs the term "outsider"
"in order to avoid 'minority'-a term that belies the numerical significance of the
constituencies typically excluded from jurisprudential discourse." Id. at 2323 n.15.
For a discussion of "otherness" and the dichotomy between "others" and "us" or "we,"
see Alex M.Johnson,Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice
of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV.
803, 832-34 (1994) (contending that the voice of color as "other" or "them," rather
than as "same" or "us," forces minority scholars to embrace a perspectival approach
in which issues are seen dichotomously from both an insider and outsider perspec-
tive).
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behavior and assumes that a perfect market will produce a perfect
world, that is, one free of inefficient discrimination. 12 Hence, the
goal of market adherents is to design rules that produce a more
perfect efficiency-maximizing market. To the contrary, the inter-
ventionist model assumes that discrimination will not be eradicated
via market mechanisms and assumes that people adapt to legal rules
and internalize them. Consequently, interventionists prescribe the
adoption of antidiscrimination rules or regulations. Their goal is to
create perfect default rules and regulations to combat discrimina-
tion.
Part II examines both of these models in light of the apparent
failure of American society to reduce or eliminate residential
housing segregation in any meaningful way. An examination of
both theories reveals flaws that lessen their value as remedies for
housing discrimination. Adopting a predictive or positivistic
approach, I first demonstrate, as have others, that the market model
may entrench rather than lessen segregation. In addition, this
section reveals a paradox that explains why the market model fails
to work in the discrete, fixed, one-shot transaction that is represen-
tative of the sale of a private residence, when accepted economic
theory supports the contention that a seller of real property should
be motivated to sell to the highest bidder, irrespective of race, if
that seller is terminating her relationship with the land and the
neighbors associated with it. On the contrary, the residential sale
transaction should, to a degree, be viewed as a relational con-
tract,"3 at least with respect to third-party effects. Those third-
2 As noted below, however, the existence and operation of "efficient discrimi-
nation" exists, and its presence is one of the factors that leads to the continuation of
discrimination. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
" Charles Goetz and Robert Scott define a relational contract as follows:
A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of
reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations.
Such definitive obligations may be impractical because of inability to
identify uncertain future conditions or because of inability to characterize
complex adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves can
be identified in advance.... [Liong-term contracts are more likely than
short-term agreements to fit this conceptualization, but temporal extension
per se is not the defining characteristic.
CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1091 (1981). Relational contracts differ from standard or complete contingent
contracts because the complete contingent contract assumes complete risk allocation
ex ante; in other words, performance standards are reduced to specific obligations.
In the complete contingent contract, parties are assumed to be able to allocate all the
risks ex ante, because they are presumed to have access to complete information
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party effects cause market failure and reinforce the discriminatory
animus of the residential seller.
In contrast, the major flaw in the interventionist model is
exposed through an analysis of its normative base. The interven-
tionist model presupposes that the normative base that generates
the antidiscrimination message or preference is uniform and
accepted. I assert to the contrary that a significant failure of the
interventionist model is the articulation of a uniform message that
racism is unacceptable in contemporary American society. Part II
demonstrates that the interventionist model is likely to continue to
fail to remediate American society's racial issues in housing and
elsewhere as long as fixed racial categorizations continue to be
made and enforced in American society.
Consequently, in the last section of Part II, I assume that the
interventionist model is viable, but point out that it is inconsistent
because American society advocates an antidiscrimination norm
through laws such as the Fair Housing Act, but simultaneously
promotes racial distinctiveness through such policies as the "one
drop of blood rule."14 I conclude, given the history and power of
racism in the United States, that neither the antidiscrimination
principle nor the adaptive preference it encourages will ever fully
be internalized into society as long as the historically prevalent
racial distinctiveness paradigm is also promoted as an endogenous
preference.
In Part III, I apply the insights of Parts I and II to current
residential housing patterns in American society to explain why
about all the future contingencies and the relevant legal rules that could affect their
relationship. See CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward
a General Theoiy of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967,971 n.11 (1983) (noting
that contracting parties allocate risks to those who are best able to bear the risks).
Professors Goetz and Scott explain that parties are prevented from forming
complete contingent contracts-allocating all the risks in the document-only by the
costs of negotiating and actually writing the terms. As Professor Subha Narasimhan
has adeptly summarized: "Under this view, while the contract is incomplete, the
contract as supplemented with the underlying contract rules represents a complete
allocation made by the parties." Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete
Contracting, and the Bargain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1129-30 n.24 (1986).
Thus, although parties to a complete contingent contract may choose to assume
certain risks, those risks are foreseeable and allocated by the parties in the agreement.
See CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of
the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 267
& n.10 (1985) (discussing contractual deficiencies arising from imperfect communica-
tion and definition).
14 For a definition of the "one drop of blood rule," see infra note 23.
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segregation is increasing rather than decreasing in a society in
which racism is regarded as irrational and wrongheaded. In
addition, I attempt to resolve yet another well-documented paradox.
Because Blacks are disproportionately represented among the poor,
they should be disproportionately represented in poor communities
consonant with their proportion in that population. 5 Moreover,
because both poor whites and poor Blacks have limited choices in
housing due to their impoverished state, one would expect them to
live in the same communities. Quite the contrary, as Part III
demonstrates, there is more, rather than less, segregation among
the poor.
Looking at it from one perspective, in a world in which higher
income means more choices, it is perhaps easier to explain why a
wealthy community may be totally segregated, or all-white. For
example, one could envision a scenario in which whites move out
when Blacks move into the community. 6 That option is more
easily available if the whites have the financial assets to relocate
easily.
More realistically, another factor leading to that all-white
wealthy community may be the fact that no Blacks have the requisite
income to purchase housing in that neighborhood. Hence, the
market may work to preclude integration. Another, more insidious
factor may be that the residents of the wealthy community, who
have many choices about where to live, may freely choose to situate
themselves in communities in which only other whites live.' 7 In a
"5 See, e.g., Michael F. Potter, Note, Racial Diversity in Residential Communities:
Societal Housing Patterns and aProposalfora "Racial Inclusionaty Ordinance", 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1151, 1169 (1990) ("If income were a primary factor [in producing segregated
communities], racial diversity would be highest in lower income communities.").
For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
" This is exactly what happens at lower income levels through the practice known
as "blockbusting." Realtors used blockbusting methods "to open up neighborhoods
to black entry and to reap profits during the transition." MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 3, at 37. Massey and Denton explain the process as follows:
Blockbusting agents would select a promising area for racial turnover, most
often an area adjacent to the ghetto that contained older housing, poorer
families, aging households, and some apartment buildings. Agents would
then quietly acquire a few homes or apartments in the area, and rent or sell
them to carefully chosen black families. Given the intensity of black
demands and the depths of white prejudice, the entry of a relatively small
number of black settlers would quickly surpass the threshold of white
tolerance and set off a round of racial turnover.
Id. at 37-38.
17 For example, high-priced cooperative apartments, or "co-ops," in New York City
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world in which the poor have fewer choices because of their
necessitous economic situation, one would expect that the socioeco-
nomic status of the poor, both white and black, would consign them
to live in relatively integrated, "poor" communities in which the
only defining characteristic of the inhabitants is poverty.
As Part III details, however, an examination of the data reveals
that the poor are more likely to live in segregated communities than
those who are economically advantaged. Indeed, it is my hypothesis
that Blacks will encounter less discrimination and racism as they
achieve higher degrees of economic status." In this context,
money or socioeconomic status has an impact on the degree of
segregation experienced by Blacks. Poverty, then, serves a dual role
in the maintenance of Black segregated communities. First, poverty
and all that it entails19 reinforces negative racial stereotypes of
Blacks by whites and leads to efforts to exclude and separate.
Second, the poverty experienced by whites causes them to value the
only significant attribute they possess-the property right in their
are well-known for the selectivity that they apply in approving or rejecting prospective
tenants. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 934-35 (3d ed. 1993)
(noting that "numerous prominent persons have been excluded from cooperative
apartments," including ex-President Richard Nixon).
's See THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE 106-07 (1994). Sowell believes that
as groups become more acculturated into mainstream norms, they become more
geographically or spatially integrated into society. His explanation for the existence
of ghettos is premised on the post-World War II mass migration of southern rural
Blacks into cities. His thesis fails to explain, however, why this group, which has
populated the ghetto for 80 years, has not moved on to more affluent neighborhoods
as did their Irish,Jewish, or other immigrant predecessors. For further discussion,
see infra notes 25-26, 136-41 and accompanying text.
"9 Here I am referring to poor educational opportunities, crumbling infrastruc-
ture, poor housing, and little or no economic opportunities that inevitably lead to a
rise in criminal behavior and drug use, along with the residents' increased reliance
on public support such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), that all
nicely dovetail with prevailing negative stereotypes of Blacks. For a further discussion
of this phenomenon, see MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 118-25 (contending that
racial segregation concentrates poverty in minority neighborhoods). See also Douglas
S. Massey, Getting Away with Murder Segregation and Violent Crime in America, 143 U.
PA. L. REv. 1203, 1210-17 (1995) (linking high rates of Black crime to high levels of
Black poverty and high levels of segregation); Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter,
The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban
America, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1285, 1286-90 (1995) (describing the increase in
concentrated poverty in U.S. cities over the past two decades and the resultant
problems); infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (stating that poverty in the ghetto
has created the underclass and the problems associated with the inner city); infra part
III (discussing the impact of the property right in whiteness on the urban poor).
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whiteness-and leads them to go to great lengths to protect this
valuable asset.
Part III concludes by focusing on the intersection of race and
poverty from a different perspective, a perspective that is enriched
by the insights provided by recent scholarship in Critical Race
Theory.2" Part III demonstrates that the traditional analysis of the
intersection of race and poverty and its impact on segregated
residential housing is flawed and incomplete because it fails to
properly take into account the "property" value that whites derive
from maintaining their superior racial classification as whites. Much
scholarship has recently been devoted to detailing the property or
status value that whites obtain in maintaining a racial distinction
between themselves and others.
21
Concomitantly, what is missing in that scholarship is the role
that residential segregation plays in maintaining the property or
status value of superiority. Hence, Part III attempts to provide a
piece that fits two different puzzles. First, I demonstrate that the
value that whites derive in maintaining their whiteness is a primary
factor leading to the residential segregation that is prevalent in
society. Second and synergistically, that geographic separation from
Blacks and others creates a property or status value in whiteness,
especially among the lower socioeconomic classes.
Given that insight, Part IV turns to what can be done to reduce
the residential segregation produced by racism, poverty, and the
creation of a property right in whiteness. Yet another paradox is
revealed that is explanatory of the law's failure to remediate housing
discrimination. I contend that housing discrimination (and other
forms of discrimination like employment discrimination) will not be
20 Although it was once popular to attempt to define the parameters of Critical
Race Theory by reference to the articles that are correctly characterized as repre-
sentative of this genre of legal scholarship, see, e.g., Roy Brooks & MaryJo Newborn,
Critical Race Theoy and Classical-Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without
a Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REV. 787, 787 n.3 (1994) (citing writings on Critical Race
Theory); Peller, supra note 10, at 758 n.2 (defining Critical Race Theory), I choose
not to do so because any such attempt is doomed to fail due to the overabundance
of literature that may properly be characterized as Critical Race Theory. For a
relatively recent summary of Critical Race Theory articles, see Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of
Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995); Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Critical
Race Theoy: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993).
2 See e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1019-33 (1995)
(discussing the individual preference for esteem and status within a group). For
further discussion of this issue, see infra part III.
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eliminated as long as the goal, the attainment of a color-blind
society in which race is irrelevant, is inconsistent with the manner
in which race is treated by law and society. Antidiscrimination law
in housing is modeled on a premise that race is and should be
irrelevant (which, of course, is a laudable goal or ideal). Race,
however, albeit socially constructed,22 continues to matter. The
fact that race is socially constructed must be confronted because it
reveals a much deeper problem. The problem, or inconsistency,
that leads to the failure of antidiscrimination law in housing is the
American legal system's incorporation of the recognition of race
and the differentiation of individuals based on race. In Part IV, I
contend that it is impossible to eradicate racial discrimination as
long as the current racial typography is maintained in which white
is differentiated from Black by the "one drop of blood rule."
23
In a perfect world, race would be eliminated as a category pur-
suant to which individuals are segregated and classified. Because a
perfect world does not exist, eliminating all racial classification from
the law-for example, in the census-is unrealistic because it fails to
recognize that race has mattered up to this point in time. 24 Thus,
' On this I find myself in rare agreement with Professor Sowell:
Neither race nor related concepts can be used in any scientifically precise
sense to refer to people inhabiting this planet today, after centuries of
genetic intermixtures. The more generic term, race, will be used here in a
loose sense to refer to a social phenomenon with a biological component,
rather than make a dichotomy whose precision is illusory.
Whatever the biological reality, race as a social concept is a powerful
force uniting and dividing people. Whether visible on the physical surface
or simply felt in the emotional depths, race provides the cohesive groupings
in which cultures have been concentrated, transmitted and carried around
the world.
SOWELL, supra note 18, at 6; see also infra note 24.
2 Gotanda, supra note 8, at 24. Professor Gotanda describes the "one drop of
blood rule" as follows:
American racial classifications follow two formal rules:
1) Rule of recognition: Any person whose Black-African ancestry is
visible is Black.
2) Rule of descent: (a) Any person with a known trace of African
ancestry is Black, notwithstanding that person's visual appearance;
or, stated differently, (b) the offspring of a Black and a white is
Black.
Id. (footnote omitted).
24 Indeed, it is appropriate to note at this early stage that what I find puzzling,
problematical, and ultimately paradoxical is that much of the data on residential
housing segregation is premised on a category-race-that has no fixed, scientific
meaning. To prove the segregation of neighborhoods, one must prove Blacks and
DESTABILIZING RACE
instead of asking for the abolition of all racial categories or
classifications, I propose a more modest step: destabilizing racial
classifications in such a way that the property value in whiteness,
and the characterization of Blacks as outsiders, is severely weak-
ened, if not eliminated. This destabilization addresses housing
discrimination from a different perspective. This perspective
acknowledges that as long as there are stable categories of "white"
on the one hand, and "Black" on the other, whites have an eco-
nomic incentive to maintain their alleged racially superior status as
white. To reduce that incentive, one must eliminate the artificial
racial distinction between whites and Blacks. Integration will ensue
when racial identification becomes fluid and contingent rather than
fixed and definitive.
I. AN EMPIRICAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SEGREGATION
IN THE RESIDENTIAL HOUSING MARKET
In this Part, I begin by noting both the extent of residential
segregation and the traditional rationales put forth to explain the
continued and increasing amount of residential segregation in
contemporary American society. These rationales are then analyzed
and detailed to provide a baseline pursuant to which my thesis
concerning the unique interaction or intersection of race and
poverty can be measured and tested. Particular attention is paid to
the twin causes of racism and poverty as causative factors for the
construction and persistence of segregated ghettos.25 My thesis
represents an attempt to build on, rather than refute, these
conventional rationales and to demonstrate that they are incomplete
whites are distinct. If indistinct scientifically, genetically, or biologically, the
distinctiveness provided by race must be socially constructed. See supra note 22. If
socially constructed, it can be deconstructed. That, in essence, represents the
purpose of Part IV of this Article. I propose the method of deconstruction in Alex
M. Johnson, Jr., Destabilizing Racial Categorizations Based on Lessons from Trade-
mark Law (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See also supra note
22 and accompanying text.
2 For the purposes of this Article, I will follow Massey and Denton's use of the
term "ghetto":
[A] ghetto is a set of neighborhoods exclusively inhabited by members of
one group, within which virtually all members of that group live. By this
definition, no ethnic or racial group in the history of the United States,
except one, has ever experienced ghettoization, even briefly. For urban
Blacks, the ghetto has been the paradigmatic residential configuration for
at least eighty years.
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 18-19.
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because the manner in which racism and poverty interact is based
on fixed and stable characterizations of what is white and, converse-
ly, what is Black. Those characterizations play an important role in
consigning Blacks uniquely to ghettos from which few can escape.
26
A. The Prevalence of Segregation
It is beyond cavil that the vast majority of Blacks live in urban
residential ghettos. The problem, as Massey and Denton demon-
strate in their path-breaking work, is the perception that residential
segregation, and the harms engendered thereby, were terminated
with the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.27 Thus, al-
though race and related issues28 continue to command the atten-
tion of many of our best legal scholars29 and social scientists,"0
26 As the previous footnote indicates, the ghetto has been the singular province
of Blacks. In this context, then, the dissimilar experiences of other minorities and
immigrant groups is quite instructive. Whereas many immigrants from Europe and
Latin America experienced U.S. cities as "vehicles for integration, economic advance-
ment, and ultimately,-assimilation into American life," rural Blacks found that these
same cities "became a trap" that ensured their "continued subordination." Id. at 18.
The key question, of course, is why has the experience been unique for Blacks? The
answer, I contend, has much to do with the legacy of slavery and the operation of the
one drop of blood rule that precludes the assimilation of any members of this group
into "white society," but does not preclude the assimilation of immigrant groups and
other minorities (except perhaps Asian-Americans). In another article, I attempt to
explain why Blacks have not been assimilated into American society, and I compare
that failure to assimilate to the successful assimilation of other minority groups,
especially Asian-Americans. See Johnson, supra note 24. For a discussion of the
unique position in which Asian-Americans find themselves as the "model minority,"
see Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The "Reticent"Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1 (1994) (detailing the dissimilar experiences of Asian-Americans in
American society and the paradoxes created by these experiences when their collec-
tive experience is compared to the myths and public perception of that racial group).
27 See Chew, supra note 26, at 3-9.
28 Related issues include affirmative action, see Daniel Farber, The Outmoded Debate
over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893 (1994) (analyzing the affirmative action
debate and focusing on the views expressed by critical race theorists); Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the
Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043 (contending that the debate over the existence and
merit of affirmative action programs has been improperly transmuted into a debate
over the existence and merit of quotas), and the even more controversial issue of
whether Blacks are genetically, intellectually inferior to whites. See CHARLES MURRAY
& RICHARD J. HERNNSTEIN, THE BELL CURVE (1994) (arguing that intelligence as
measured by IQscores is correlated, to some degree, with racial identification). For
a more well-reasoned and lucid discussion of race, intelligence, and heredity, see
SOWELL, supra note 18, at 156-85. Charles Murray's earlier contribution to race
relations was presented in his book, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY,
1950-1980 (1984) (arguing that welfare produces poverty among Blacks).
29 See supra note 20 (citing recent legal scholarship on the issue of race).
30 See, e.g., LIFE NOTES: PERSONAL WRITINGS BY CONTEMPORARY BLACK WOMEN
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many have ignored the issues raised by the continued persistence of
the ghetto and its impact on American society.
What needs to be recognized and popularly acknowledged, as it
has been documented, is that the promise of racial integration of
the Sixties and Seventies has given way to the failure of integration
in the Eighties and Nineties. The advent of the Fair Housing Act,
along with other civil rights acts,"1 as well as the broadening use of
affirmative action to integrate colleges and universities 2 and the
workplace, 3 all seemed to portend significant changes in American
race relations in the late Sixties and the Seventies. In addition, as
Blacks as well as whites moved to suburbs, and as the migration of
Blacks to northern urban cities reversed itself, demographic patterns
seemed to support racial integration. 4 Lastly, economic condi-
tions seemed to favor residential integration due to the fact that in
the late Sixties and early Seventies Black income levels were rising,
culminating in the lowest rate of Black poverty in United States
history in 1973."5
By 1980, however, the dream of integration had given way to the
reality of increased segregation of our major urban cities and the
problems associated with such ghettos:
[I]n contrast to the steady improvement in black socioeconomic
status through 1973, the decade ended in record unemployment,
inflation, falling wages, increasing income inequality, and rising
rates of black poverty. Not only did the ghetto fail to disappear;
in many ways its problems multiplied. As segregation persisted,
black isolation deepened, and the social and economic problems
(Patricia Bell-Scott ed., 1994); LURE AND LOATHING, supra note 8; THOMAS SOWELL,
THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE (1983); STUDS TERKEL, RACE: How BLACKS
AND WHITES THINK AND FEEL ABOUT THE AMERICAN OBSESSION (1992); CORNEL
WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993).
" See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L.
No. 88-352,78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1988
& Supp. V 1993)).
12 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (defining the
constitutional boundaries of affirmative action programs).
-- See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (discussing
affirmative action in the workplace under Title VII).
34 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 60.
3
5 Id. at 60-61.
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that had long plagued African American communities worsened.
During the 1970s, the ghetto gave birth to the underclass. 6
An examination of housing statistics reveals that segregation is
still near pre-Brown levels, and little progress toward integration has
been made. 7 In almost every major northern metropolitan area,"8
whites live in neighborhoods that are almost exclusively white, and
Blacks live in predominantly, almost overwhelmingly, Black
neighborhoods."9 In some cities, the segregation is as complete as
it was when it was legislated and enforced judicially;4" "[t]he parks,
schools, city services, and churches for black neighborhoods attract
few, if any, white patrons."
41
s Id. at 61 (endnote omitted).
, On a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing total segregation, U.S. housing
in 1980 rated an 80 for the 16 metropolitan areas with the largest Black populations,
representing only slight improvement from previous decades. See A COMMON
DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 27 (Gerald D.Jaynes & Robin M. Williams,
Jr. eds., 1989) [hereinafter A COMMON DESTINY] (noting a drop of an average of six
rating points compared to the 1970 segregation survey); see also Sharman Stein, Study
Challenges Notions of "Black Flight", CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1990, at 1, 21 ("'Although
discrimination against blacks in the labor force, and in public life generally, has fallen
markedly since the 1960s, housing is one area where discrimination and segregation
have persisted'...." (quoting Douglas Massey, Professor of Sociology, University of
Pennsylvania)).
38 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 63-65 (stating that, as a result of"distinctive
Southern traits," segregation levels are lower in Southern urban areas when compared
to Northern urban areas).
" In 15 of the 29 metropolitan areas with the largest Black populations in 1980,
whites lived in neighborhoods that were 90% or more white. See A COMMON DESTINY,
supra note 37, at 90. Blacks in Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland lived in neighbor-
hoods that were at least 80% Black. See id. In their study on the extent of
segregation in residential areas, Massey and Denton determined that
roughly one-quarter of the American black population lives in an urban
environment that is hypersegregated.... Residents of such an environment
would be very unlikely to come into regular contact with a member of Anglo
society, except through participation in the labor force, an option that is
denied to the quarter of central-city blacks who are under- or unemployed.
Massey & Denton, supra note 6, at 382. Massey and Denton further observed that
only 2% of metropolitan Blacks live in a residential pattern that may be considered
"integrated." Id.
40 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977) (prohibiting racially motivated zoning decisions that result in
residential discrimination, but failing to find racial animus in the case at hand);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1948) (holding unanimously that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids courts from enforcing racially restrictive covenants).
41 A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 37, at 91; see also Massey & Denton, supra note
6, at 389 ("Not only are blacks in our largest cities disproportionately likely to share
tracts with other blacks, they are very unlikely to share a tract with any whites at all.").
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B. The Causes of Segregation
Four causes are often given to explain both the existence of
residential segregation and what has caused that segregation to
increase rather than dissipate following the passage of the Fair
Housing Act of 1968.42 First, racism no doubt continues to exist
and to cause whites to resist living with or around Blacks in
integrated neighborhoods." Opinion polls mask the racism that
is prevalent in American society because they continue to show that
whites, as well as Blacks, adopt the principles of housing access and
equal treatment in race relations in their rhetoric but not in their
practices.44 One study concluded that "[i]n practice, many whites
refuse or are reluctant to participate," embrace, or operate on these
principles if the result is "close, frequent, or prolonged social
contact" with minorities, such as living next door to them.
45
Basically, "the prevalent white attitude is 'Yeah, I'm for integration,
but not in my neighborhood.'
" 41
42 Some have attributed the failure of the Fair Housing Act to remediate
segregation to a systemic and fundamental defect:
Although a comprehensive open housingbill finally passed Congress under
unusual circumstances in 1968, it was stripped of its enforcement provisions
as its price of enactment, yielding a Fair Housing Act that was structurally
flawed and all but doomed to fail....
As long as the Fair Housing Act is enforced individually rather than
systematically, it is unlikely to be effective in overcoming the structural
arrangements that support segregation and sustain the ghetto. Until the
government throws its considerable institutional weight behind efforts to
dismantle the ghetto, racial segregation will persist.
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 14-15.
4' Although it is indeed plausible that there are numerous Blacks who, if given a
meaningful choice, would choose not to live with whites, for the purpose of this
Article I make what I hope is a reasonable assumption that given the paucity of
services and the crumbling infrastructure of the ghetto, most Blacks would prefer to
live in integrated communities with whites, if only to obtain the higher level of
services associated with such neighborhoods. A more difficult question is presented
if it is assumed that similar services can be provided to ghetto dwellers. In that
situation, real questions arise concerning whether integration is a particularly viable
strategy for Blacks. For further discussion of this point, see supra note 10 and
accompanying text (discussing theories about whether Blacks would integrate if given
the choice).
"' SeeJohnson, supra note 28, at 1049.
45 A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 37, at 11.
46 Walter Shapiro, Unfinished Business, TIME, Aug. 7, 1989, at 12, 15. This is best
characterized as the current equivalent of the oft-expressed sentiment of the Eighties,
"Some of my best friends are Blacks, but I wouldn't want my daughter to marry one,"
that is articulated to prove how liberal the speaker is when it comes to race relations.
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Moreover, even though this society has adopted, in principle, an
antidiscrimination norm in which race and other immutable
characteristics are deemed irrelevant to entitlement distributions, it
is beyond peradventure that race and racism, especially as it applies
to Blacks when compared to other racial and ethnic groups,
continue to matter and cause detriment to Blacks when compared
to similarly situated whites and, to a lesser extent, other minorities.
In other words, Blacks continue to be victimized by discrimina-
tion"7 in American society in general and in the housing market in
particular.
4 8
More importantly for the purposes herein is the proof that there
is a significant link between discrimination, racism, or prejudice and
the resulting segregation.4" That discrimination leads to segrega-
tion might seem to a casual observer obvious and'in little need of
defense orjustification. What must not be overlooked nor ignored,
however, is the cyclical or synergistic effect that discrimination has
on the production of an underclass that is spatially limited to urban
ghettos.5 0
" Professor Cass R. Sunstein has aptly and accurately described the term
"discrimination" as "protean." Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimi-
nation, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1991, at 22, 22 n.1. For working purposes, I
provide Professor Sunstein's definition of discrimination, with which I agree:
Discrimination should, I suggest, be understood to include any decision that
treats an otherwise similarly qualified black, woman, or handicapped person
less favorably than a white, male, or able-bodied person, whether the reason
for the decision lies in malice, taste, selective empathy and indifference,
economic self-interest, or rational stereotyping. This understanding of
discrimination picks up not merely covert unequal treatment, but also
requirements that are neutral "on their face" but that would not have been
adopted if the burdened and benefitted groups had been reversed. It does
not pick up measures merely having discriminatory effects unless those
effects are, in the sense indicated, tied up with racial, sexual, or other bias.
Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
48 Massey and Denton come to a similar conclusion. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 3, at 109 (stating that "discrimination against blacks is widespread and continues
at very high levels in urban housing markets").
" See, e.g., George C. Galster, More Than Skin Deep: The Effect of Housing
Discrimination on the Extent and Pattern of Racial Residential Segregation in the United
States, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 119, 129-31 (John M.
Goering ed., 1986) (confirming, through data gathered from a 1977 survey by the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, an empirical link between
discrimination and segregation). But see MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 109
("The persistence of prejudice, discrimination, and segregation in American cities
strongly suggests a possible causal connection, but a mere coincidence of trends does
not necessarily link racist attitudes and behaviors to segregation.").
o Massey and Denton also note this aspect of Galster's findings:
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Although causally linked to racism, the outward flight of whites
to suburbia-leaving, as one songwriter described, a "chocolate city"
surrounded by "vanilla suburbs"5 t-is clearly a factor in maintaining
residential segregation patterns in an era in which overt racism has
diminished and lost favor. The white exodus to outlying areas
causes further depredations in the inner city and leads to an
inadequate tax base for school funding and other social programs
and initiatives.52
As cities have maintained their place as economic and financial
centers, one can only guess what urban neighborhoods might look
like in the absence of suburbs. The existence of suburbs has
allowed cities to maintain their economic promise and vitality while
at the same time creating and maintaining the deplorable segre-
gated conditions that detrimentally impact Blacks. Not so coinci-
dentally, the creation and subsidization53 of suburbs not only allow
for segregated neighborhoods, but also provide a stable white work
force or employee base that makes those who are geographically
proximate to the jobs-Blacks in the inner city-largely superfluous.
The third factor that has led to increased segregation is the
existence of government and private lender policies that discrimi-
nate against Blacks in the residential housing market in such a way
as to restrict Blacks' choice of housing locales. It is fairly well
documented that the construction of the urban ghetto as we know
it was in place prior to World War II: a confluence of factors
coalesced shortly after the war and continued through the Seventies,
[Galster] also discovered that segregation itself has important feedback
effects on socioeconomic status. Not only does discrimination lead to
segregation, but segregation, by restricting economic opportunities for
blacks, produces interracial economic disparities that incite further
discrimination and more segregation.
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 109 (endnote omitted).
5' See id. at 61 (citing MALBIX/RICKS Music, Chocolate City (Casablanca Records
1976)).
52 On the differential school funding rates for white and Black students, see
JONATHAN KOzOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 119-24 (1991).
" The use of tax dollars to build freeways and highways is appropriately viewed
as a subsidy for whites who need easy ingress and egress to and from their urban
work place. "In making this transition from urban to suburban life, middle-class
whites demanded and got massive federal investments in highway construction that
permitted rapid movement to and from central cities by car." MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 3, at 44. It is interesting to speculate what the inner cities or ghettos
would look like if the same degree of resources were poured into the infrastructure
of these communities.
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solidifying the presence and expansion of the Black ghetto. 4
Moreover, it is neither original nor insightful to note that it was
discriminatory action on the part of realtors and other private actors
in the real estate industry that was a major causative factor in the
birth and maintenance of the ghetto.5
Similarly, it is fairly well-known and documented that what is
true today with respect to the discriminatory animus and patterns
of private residential mortgage lenders56 was also true historically
and had a significant impact on the construction of the ghetto.
What is not as well-known and in need of publication is the
government's role, through its agencies, in actively constructing the
ghetto and the responsibility it bears for the current segregation
therein. Indeed, although "redlining" is decried as an insidious tool
of private bankers to limit lending to certain (minority) neighbor-
hoods, the genesis of redlining rests with the federal government
and can be traced, until very recently, to government edicts:
Beginning in the 1930s, the federal government launched a series
of programs designed to ... make home ownership widely
available to the American public. The Home Owners' Loan
Corporation (HOLC) was the first of these programs, and it served
as a model for later efforts....
Unfortunately for blacks, the HOLC also initiated and
institutionalized the practice of "redlining." This discriminatory
54See id. at 42-57.
" Massey and Denton trace the discriminatory policies of realtors over the past
40 years:
[A] comprehensive study of real estate policies in the 1950s ... revealed a
pervasive pattern of discrimination against blacks in most American cities.
In [the] survey of real estate agents in Chicago, [it was] found that 80% of
realtors refused to sell blacks property in white neighborhoods, and 68%
refused to rent them such property. Moreover, among those agents who did
sell or rent to blacks, half said they would do so only under restrictive
conditions, such as when a significant number of blacks had already entered
the area. Another survey of Chicago's real estate agents ... in the mid-
1960s found that only 29% of agents were willing to rent to blacks
unconditionally (regardless of local market conditions or racial composi-
tion), and half of these open-minded agents were black.
Id. at 50 (endnotes omitted).
' See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (tracing redlining by private banks
to federal government policies beginning in the 1930s).
' See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 50-51 ("Among realtors offering infor-
mation on the issue, 62% felt that few or very few banks were willing to make loans
to blacks, and half of the agents confirmed that banks would not make loans to areas
that were black, turning black, or threatened with the possibility of black entry.").
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practice grew out of a ratings system HOLO developed to evaluate
the risks associated with loans made to specific urban neighbor-
hoods. Four categories of neighborhood quality were established,
and lowest was coded with the color red; it and the next-lowest
category virtually never received HOLW loans.58
What is almost unknown and also worthy of a lengthy quotation
is the extent to which both the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) programs that spurred the
development of single-family home ownership were skewed in favor
of encouraging the growth of white suburbia and against maintain-
ing the inner city, which was and is largely populated by Blacks:
[T]he marriage of FHA financing and new construction techniques
made it cheaper to buy new suburban homes than to rent
comparable older dwellings in the central city. As a result, the
FHA and VA contributed significantly to the decline of the inner
city by encouraging the selective out-migration of middle-class
whites to the suburbs.
*.. FHA practices and regulations ... favored the construc-
tion of single-family homes but discouraged the building of multi-
family units.... But the most important factor encouraging white
suburbanization and reinforcing the segregation of blacks was the
FHA requirement for an "unbiased," professional appraisal of
insured properties, which naturally included a rating of the
neighborhood.
... In evaluating neighborhoods, the agency followed the
HOLC's earlier lead in racial matters; it too manifested an
obsessive concern with the presence of what the 1939 FHA
Underwriting Manual called "inharmonious racial or nationality
groups." According to the manual, "if a neighborhood is to retain
stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be
occupied by the same social and racial classes."59
This historical exegesis would be largely irrelevant if it were
solely historical. Unfortunately, the discrimination that led to the
creation and maintenance of redlining continues to exist in more
subtle, yet no less effective, forms. As Peter Swire has shown, prior
to enactment of the Fair Housing Act, the government (through
various agencies), the realtors, and the financial institutions
associated with the housing industry set in motion and helped per-
petuate the very racial discrimination that the Fair Housing Act later
58Id. at 51 (endnotes omitted).
59Id. at 53-54 (endnotes omitted).
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outlawed.6" Moreover, the effects of that earlier period of overt
discrimination continue to have serious repercussions for Blacks
wishing to purchase homes outside the largely Black ghettos.6
As recent empirical studies show, the discriminatory lending
patterns and practices detailed by academicians is fact, not fiction.
In tests conducted by undercover agents employed by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal
Reserve Board, "[m]ortgage applications of minorities were rejected
up to three times more frequently than applications of whites, even
if they had similar incomes."62 Further, minority couples were
given less information about financing, were steered into different
neighborhoods than whites, and were told houses had been rented
or sold when they really had not.63
The fourth factor that has led to the creation and maintenance
of segregation is poverty. This factor, however, is complicated
because poverty is not only a cause of segregation, but also a
product. Consequently, poverty is synergistic in the housing
context, both producing segregation and intensifying its effects.
Thus, with regard to poverty, there is an economic component, or
causative factor, of segregation that must be addressed.'
0 See Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and
Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REv. 787, 793-802 (1995).
61 One commentator has pointed out the lingering reverberations from earlier
housing and lending policies:
The continuing discrimination and redlining in both mortgage and
consumer credit hinder the ability of Black people to buy and improve their
homes and therefore block asset accumulation, stakeholding, and revitaliza-
tion in Black communities. The ongoing consolidation of the banking
industry has had and will continue to have a profound negative impact in
low- and moderate-income communities and in non-White communities.
Anthony D. Taibi, Banking Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural
Economic Theoy, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1463, 1466 (1994) (citation omitted).
" Margaret L. Usdansky, HousingAct Fails to Eliminate Bias Against Minorities, USA
TODAY, Nov. 11, 1991, at 2A; see also Joel G. Brenner & Liz Spayd, A Pattern of Bias
in Mortgage Loans, WASH. POST, June 6, 1993, at Al ("A racially biased system of
home lending exists in the Washington area, with local banks and savings and loans
providing mortgages to white neighborhoods at twice the rate they do to comparable
black ones. . . ."); H.Jane Lehman, Study: Race Factor in Loan Rejections, WASH. POST,
Oct. 24, 1992, at Fl ("[D]ata collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act...
showed a loan rejection rate 170 percent greater for blacks and other minorities
compared with that for whites.").
6 See Usdansky, supra note 62, at 2A.
6 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 84 ("30%-70% of racial segregation is
... [allegedly related] to economic factors, which, together with urban structure and
neighborhood preferences, 'bear much of the explanatory weight for present
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Poverty in ghetto neighborhoods created the underclass 65 and
the conditions of inner-city life with which we are all too famil-
iar-crime and its related drug use, violence, undereducation,
66
early pregnancy, welfare, and dependency.6 Similarly, discrimina-
tion and prejudice, combined with poverty, keep middle-class Blacks
from leaving the ghettos. Such an escape would allow these families
the opportunity to break the cycle of oppression generated by
poverty conditions." Middle-class families experience difficulties
moving out "because property values have declined and there are
few buyers for their homes." 69 If buyers are found, Blacks must
then face discriminatory realtors and lenders, as well as the prospect
that few middle-class neighborhoods will welcome them.
70
Moreover, as Part III below details, a simultaneous analysis of
race and poverty demonstrates that much of the discrimination
against Blacks can be attributed to the fact that there is a property
right in "whiteness" that poor whites maintain and protect through
residential patterns.'" (citation omitted)).
' Massey and Denton define the "urban underclass" as a coalescence of the
images of"poor minority families mired in an endless cycle of unemployment, unwed
childbearing, illiteracy, and dependency," who, in the eyes of white society, "were
unlikely to exit poverty and become self-sufficient". Id. at 4-5 (citing MICHAEL B.
KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON
WELFARE 185-235 (1989)).
' Differences in socioeconomic status, when combined with residential separation,
produce large disparities between whites and Blacks with regard to educational status.
Black dropout rates are much higher than those of whites; Black performance on
standardized achievement tests remains much lower than that of whites; and the
percentage of Blacks attending and completing college is lower than that of whites
and continues to decline. See A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 37, at 332-52 (analyzing
the trends in Black educational attainment in, among other areas, high school,
college, and standardized testing).
67 See Massey & Denton, supra note 6, at 389 ("Our results suggest that the
extremity of black residential segregation and its unique multidimensional character
may help explain the growing social and economic gap between the black underclass
and the rest of American society.").
' For many ethnic groups, breaking the cycle of oppression and improving
socioeconomic mobility can be thought of as
a cumulative process whereby economic advancement ... is translated into
residential progress (a higher-status neighborhood with better schools, peer
influences and social contacts), which in turn leads to additional socioeco-
nomic gains (children receive better educations and get betterjobs). This
avenue for cumulative socioeconomic advancement is largely closed to
blacks because of racial barriers to residential mobility.
Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation Itself Remains a Corrosive Force: Blacks Held Back
by Isolation Within Cities, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1989, at V5.
69 Stein, supra note 37, at 21.
70 See supra notes 43-48, 55-63 and accompanying text.
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the enforcement of residential segregation. 71  In addition, this
property right differentially affects poor Blacks and precludes their
integration to a greater extent than it does wealthier Blacks.
72
Before commencing a meaningful discussion of the intersection
of race and poverty and the resulting creation of whiteness as a
property right, attention must be paid to the failure of traditional
approaches to eliminate discrimination. 7 These approaches, I will
argue in Parts III and IV, failed because they inadequately inter-
nalized both the power of whiteness as a property interest or right
(upon which entitlements are based) and the stable classifications of
race (upon which the property interest or right is based).
Before exploring these theories and proposing a new legal
regime in which the stable classifications of race can be decon-
structed, I turn in Part II to an examination of the two traditional
models for the elimination of residential housing segregation and
an analysis of the defects of these approaches.
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO THE ELIMINATION
OF DISCRIMINATION
Well-intentioned advocates of social reform propose two diamet-
rically opposed models to reduce and eliminate racial discrimination
in housing, as well as in employment. The first, and less controver-
sial, model is based on the notion that the law can intervene in
otherwise private arrangements or contracts to eliminate or reduce
social activity that may be personally neutral or even beneficial, but
socially harmful (the "interventionist" model). Statutes such as Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"4 the Fair Housing Act of
7' See infra part III.
72 I contend that wealthier Blacks are not viewed as "authentically" Black by
whites, in that wealthier Blacks do not fit the stereotypical images of poor, urban
Blacks. As a result, wealthier Blacks are welcomed into all-white communities because
they are less threatening than poor Blacks. See infra text following note 99.
"' I will return to this issue in Part IV, where I take the insights provided by Parts
II and III, wed them to the traditional interventionist approach adopted in
antidiscrimination legislation, and argue for the destabilization of racial categories.
See infra part IV.
4 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993). Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "All persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined
in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). The Civil Rights Act of 1964
defines public accommodations to include, inter alia, inns, hotels, motels, restaurants,
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1968, 7 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196476 epitomize
this first model.
The more recent, and more controversial, model advocated to
eliminate harmful or unwarranted discrimination is premised on an
economic argument that the efficient operation of the market, free
of governmental intervention or regulation, will inevitably lead to
the eradication of discrimination because such discrimination is
inefficient (the "market" model).,7 In the context of this paper the
relevant market would be defined as the residential housing market.
and movie theaters. See § 2000a(b) (defining public accommodations as public
establishments that either affect commerce through their operations or are supported
in their discrimination or segregation by state action).
' Fair Housing Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The
Fair Housing Act makes it "the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C.
§ 3601.
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-2(a); see also MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 3-8 (1966) (discussing the problem of racial
discrimination in employment that precipitated the adoption of Title VII).
" As with most economic theories, the leading proponent of this thesis is Judge
Richard A. Posner, who, drawing upon the pioneering work of Gary Becker, states:
Although discrimination is consistent with competition, . .. there are
economic forces at work in competitive markets that tend to minimize
discrimination. In a market of many sellers the intensity of the prejudice
against blacks will vary. Some sellers will have only a mild prejudice against
them. These sellers will not forgo as many advantageous transactions with
blacks as their more prejudiced competitors (unless the law inteferes). Their
costs will therefore be lower, and this will enable them to increase their
share of the market. The least prejudiced sellers will come to dominate the
market in much the same way as people who are least afraid of heights
come to dominate occupations that require working at heights: They
demand a smaller premium. This is not to say that discrimination will
disappear. Discrimination based on taste-an unreasoned aversion to
members of another race-will, if the above analysis is correct, disappear
eventually from competitive markets. But efficient discrimination ... will
not, for efficient discrimination is the optimal strategy for any cost-
minimizing firm, whether or not its owners or managers have any taste for
discrimination.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 652 (4th ed. 1992) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added); see also GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMI-
NATION 122-25 (1957) (describing the concept of "taste" in regard to discrimination).
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Each model has its supporters and detractors, and it is fair to
state that each model has established a body of voluminous
scholarship whose full exegesis is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, each model can be criticized for its minimization of
the function of race and racism in this society. Each model fails to
internalize and address both the degree to which racial distinctions
have become reified in this society and the steps that must be taken
to reduce racism and discrimination in a world in which perceived
differences between whites and Blacks are actualized.
The extent to which the market model imperfectly internalizes
the reified racial distinctions in contemporary society, and the
exposition of its weakness as a vehicle to eradicate discrimination in
society at large or housing in particular, has already been explored
by others.7" A brief review, focusing heavily upon the work of
Professor Cass Sunstein,7 9 is warranted, however, if only to expose
the symmetrical weakness of the interventionist model.
A. Third-Party Effects
One major flaw in the market model is that it fails to take into
account the extent to which discriminating third parties are in a
position to impose sanctions against those who wish to break rank
and engage in nondiscriminatory behavior in order to operate effi-
ciently. 0 In the housing context, the market model presupposes
that a landlord or a seller will have an economic incentive to sell to
the highest bidder.8 1  If Blacks value living in an integrated
78 See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil
Rights Policy, 79 CEO. L.J. 1713, 1728-29 (1991) (discussing extralegal social norms
and sanctions that are used to perpetuate racial discrimination); McAdams, supra note
21, at 60 (contending that rational behavior leads members of one racial group to
seek to raise the relative status of their own group by lowering the status of other
groups); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 44-48 (1992)
(arguing that traditional economic analysis fails to internalize the concept of relative
preferences, under which individuals measure wealth and utility compared to others).
" See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1129 (1986) (evaluating grounds for rejecting private preferences, as
expressed in markets, as a basis for social choice); Sunstein, supra note 47 (arguing
that in many settings markets will fail to stop discrimination).
o See Sunstein, supra note 47, at 25 (contending that "third parties are frequently
in a position to impose financial punishments on non-discriminatory employers").
81 As Judge Posner states:
Economic analysis helps explain the variance in compliance with anti-
discrimination laws. If the interracial associations brought about by such a
law are slight, the cost of association even to prejudiced people will be low
and they will not be willing to incur heavy costs in the form of punishment
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neighborhood more highly than like-minded whites (as they should
if they live in segregated locales), they should be willing to pay a
premium for integrated housing. As the high bidders, Blacks will
supposedly move into the neighborhood until the state of integra-
tion establishes an equilibrium price at which whites and Blacks
value entry into the neighborhood equally.
In the housing context, as in the typically modeled employment
context in which the neutral employer must cede to her employees'
taste for discrimination and act discriminatorily even though it is
contrary to the employer's preference, 2 third-party effects create
discrimination. Although the interactions in the rental housing
market duplicate the relational nature of interactions in the
employment context, 3 it is difficult to see how such third-party
effects would work in the sale of one's residence-a one-shot,
contingent transaction in which no continuing interaction takes
place between vendor and vendee following completion of the
transaction.
Although the sale of a residence seems to be immune from
third-party pressure to discriminate, this pressure (and the pressure
to operate supposedly against one's economic interest) is present
when two related factors are taken into account: first, the value of
whiteness as a property right, and second, the reexamination of this
one-shot, contingent transaction to expose its "relational" character-
istics that create an incentive to discriminate. 4
for, or legal expenses of, resisting compliance in order to indulge their taste.
It is not surprising that there has been general compliance with laws forbidding
people to refuse on racial grounds to sell real estate, although few resources have
been allocated to enforcing these laws. Unless the seller plans to stay in the
neighborhood, his association with a black purchaser is limited to negotiating the
sale (and a broker does that anyway). Most housing-discrimination cases,
therefore, involve rentals rather than sales.
POSNER, supra note 77, at 658 (emphasis added). For a contrary view, see infra text
accompanying note 86 (explaining how white sellers in a one-shot residential sale may
still have an incentive to discriminate).
82 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 47, at 25 (noting that "reliance on competitive
pressures will force employers to behave in a discriminatory manner if they wish to
survive").
" Interactions in the employment context are relational in that they involve one
centralized decision-maker, the employer, in a relationship with a group of individu-
als, the employees, who must interact with each other in a cooperative manner to faci-
litate the group's interest, as well as the employer's interest. Expressed in terms of
the rental housing market, the employer (landlord) has an ownership interest in an
underlying asset (the dwelling units) that produces rents through the work of employ-
ees (tenants) who, in order to optimize profits, operate (live) in a cooperative manner.
" For a definition of relational contracts, see supra note 13. For further
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Turning to this first factor, assume that whiteness, including
one's identification as a white person adhering to the collective
norm that promotes whiteness as a property right, is internalized as
a positive value by the white seller. Presume further that whites
favor the preservation of all-white communities irrespective of the
location of their own personal residence. This assumption can
explain why white sellers (and, more obviously, white landlords)
refuse to sell or rent to Blacks, even if the white seller does not lose
the positive or associational attributes of being white when she sells
her home to a Black and moves to another predominantly or
exclusively white neighborhood.
An easy way to explain why whites refuse to sell to Blacks is to
state that sellers have an incentive to discriminate against Blacks
because of the simple and ultimately wrong-headed assumption that
white sellers adhere to discriminatory norms because of what I will
cavalierly characterize as the "Golden Rule" thesis. According to
this thesis, whites don't sell to Blacks because they act on an
internalized norm that they would not want their neighbors to sell
to Blacks, and therefore they, in good conscience, cannot do so
either. The Golden Rule thesis ignores, however, the power of
greed and the market and thus must be rejected. 5
The second and better explanation for why whites discriminate
when selling their homes is that even though the transaction is aptly
characterized as a one-shot, contingent transaction, it is not
necessarily true that the players are involved in a thick market of
buyers and sellers in which the interactions are random and
anonymous. By selling her home, a seller of real estate may
terminate her relationship with a piece of property; that does not
mean, however, that the seller has terminated her relationship with
the other owners in the neighborhood, even if it is assumed that the
seller is moving out of the neighborhood. The friendships and
relationships that the selling vendor developed while living in the
soon-to-be-transferred residence represent the key to the puzzle in
this context. The cost of losing those relationships, which may
involve friendships between other family members (one's children
discussion of the relational nature of the real estate market, see infra notes 86-92.
85 A variant of the Golden Rule Thesis is discussed below when it is argued that
intragroup cooperation produces valuable group status that motivates the seller to sell
only to other whites. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. This is not
analogous to the Golden Rule Thesis because the seller is motivated not by altruism,
but by the attainment of an economic benefit in maintaining the value of the
neighborhood.
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playing with the neighbor's children), is the sanction that third
parties can impose on the allegedly "traitorous" white neighbor who
sells her home to a Black. 6
Once that cost is taken into account, a sufficient explanation
may be given for why sellers act contrary to their alleged economic
interests by refusing to sell their homes to Blacks. Racial solidarity,
the privileging and the protection of whiteness as a property right,
is achieved and considered rational in a world in which whiteness is
a prized solidifying factor. Thus, in addition to maintaining past
relationships, racial solidarity may be used to forge new relation-
ships. As a result, a white moving into a new neighborhood may
have an incentive to prove to prospective associates, friends, and
neighbors 7 that she is bonded to and is an upstanding member of
the white community by demonstrating that the ties to her old
community have been maintained and honored.
Richard McAdams has written about the pervasiveness and
power of what he characterizes as negative relative preferences-that
is "preferences for approaching or surpassing the consumption level
of others."88  Professor McAdams argues that individuals care a
great deal about achieving social status.8 9 In a later and related
article, Professor McAdams expands his original thesis to argue that
individuals seek "the esteem of others"; that is, people care about
as If my supposition is accurate, one would expect to see whites not selling to
Blacks when they remain in close proximity to their old home or neighborhood.
Similarly, one would expect to see fewer interracial transfers as the selling family and
the relationships that the selling family creates and maintains in the older community
or neighborhood increases. Indeed, I will go out on a limb and predict that perhaps
the most frequent "blockbuster" who sells to an individual of a different race would
be an estate seller. Given my theory, I would expect a trustee or executor of an estate
of a deceased seller whose children have either long left the community or have no
immediate family to be the most likely seller to Blacks. These estate sellers provide
the perfect opportunity for the market to work without the external cost imposed by
third-party sanctions.
"' One other factor that could lead whites not to opt out and to protect their old
neighborhood from encroachment or invasion by Blacks is the desire to maintain the
reputational value of the neighborhood. Individuals can easily monitor behavior in
this area by contacting those neighbors left behind to verify the bona fides of the new
neighbor. Conversely, old, motivated neighbors can contact the "race traitor's" new
neighbors to spread their poisonous venom regarding the sale of a house by their old
neighbor to a Black. My assumption in this context is that it is virtually impossible
to keep secret the location of one's new home.
a McAdams, supra note 78, at 9.
See id. at 38-44 (demonstrating that status, or the respect that one commands
from others, is an integral part of the human social condition).
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what others think about them, independent of any other end,
including preserving one's relations within the community.
90
In the context of residential housing and related transactions,
one may view the purchase and sale of a home in a racially homo-
genous community as a cooperative endeavor in which the members
of the community cooperate in order to keep "others" or "them"
(Blacks) out of the community. The puzzle in economic terms is
why individual owners, in this version of a prisoner's dilemma,
91
do not defect when selling their homes. The answer has to do with
group esteem, which parallels the property right in whiteness92
valued and maintained in all-white or segregated communities:
[S]ome individuals would cooperate in what is nominally a pris-
oner's dilemma solely to preserve the minimal esteem strangers (ir
that community) normally feel for one another. Esteem changes
the payoffs of the game. Individuals add the "esteem rewards" and
"esteem penalties" to the stated material payoffs, and choose
accordingly. The combined payoff structure may favor coopera-
tion even though the stated material payoffs, viewed in isolation,
dictate defection.
93
Viewing transactions in the residential real estate market as
relational, rather than contingent, coupled with a recognition of the
payoffs established by group identification and the production of
group esteem, leads to a reconsideration of the traditional argu-
ments attacking the rationality of racial discrimination and its
degree of permanence. When these new factors are added to the
equation, prefaced on a stable definition of race that tautologically
reinforces the payoffs and esteem produced by group identification,
the creation and prevalence of racial discrimination in housing
remains quite plausible and rational. Hence, not only is discrimina-
tion statistically and economically rational (as the next section will
discuss), it is also a necessary and intended byproduct of the stable
racial classifications that cause relevant group identification.
o McAdams, supra note 21, at 25.
91 The classic prisoner's dilemma is described as follows:
Two men, charged with a joint violation of law, are held separately by the
police. Each is told that (1) if one confesses and the other does not, the
former will be given a reward... and the latter will be fined... (2) if both
confess, each will be fined .... At the same time, each has good reason to
believe that (3) if neither confesses, both will go clear.
WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 117-18 (1992).
For a discussion of the property right in whiteness, see infra part III.
s McAdams, supra note 21, at 24.
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B. Statistical and Economically Rational Discrimination
The traditional model of discrimination contains a second flaw
that is equally applicable to renters and sellers of habitable
dwellings, but may have a differential impact based on class
component. The flaw that reduces the power of the market model
to eradicate or reduce housing discrimination is produced because
the very racial discrimination or animus that creates segregated
neighborhoods may be in response to generalizations or stereotypes
that have a rational basis.94 Unfortunately, that rational basis may
be overbroad and discriminatory, leading to inefficiency.9 5
Indeed, as detailed previously,96 the pernicious effects of
segregation create a crucible of poverty that leads to a permanent
underclass whose low unemployment, undereducation, reliance on
government benefits, relatively high addiction to drugs, and
exposure to crime are proven facts. Race thus becomes a proxy,
such that being a Black equates with being a poor tenant or poor
neighbor. In a related context, Professor Sunstein has noted:
Along every indicator of social welfare-poverty, education,
employment, vulnerability to private (or public) violence, participa-
tion in violent crime-blacks are less well-off than whites. And in
light of those differences, it is fully possible that in certain
settings, race- and sex-based generalizations are economically
rational as proxies for relevant characteristics. Indeed, it is fully
possible that race or sex is, in some contexts, every bit as accurate
a signalling device as, say, test score, education, and previous
employment.
97
The problem with employing economically rational stereotypes
is that doing so is contrary to this society's antidiscrimination norms
and principles as embodied in the law;98 further, it requires
innocent victims who do not conform to the stereotype to bear an
impermissible burden. Lastly, although perhaps optimal from a
short-term perspective, this type of behavior may be suboptimal in
9 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 118 (noting that segregation and poverty
synergistically create isolated communities in which "a variety of other deleterious
conditions," such asjoblessness, welfare dependency, crime, and single parenthood,
become the norm).
9' See Sunstein, supra note 47, at 26 (suggesting that discriminatory behavior may
be a response to generalizations that, although overbroad and invidious, provide an
economically rational basis for employment decisions).
96See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
9 Sunstein, supra note 47, at 27.
91 See id. at 28.
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terms of long-term societal goals, such as achieving a color-blind
society in which race is not relevant.99
Moreover, it is this type of discrimination that reinforces class
differences between upper-income Blacks and their poorer counter-
parts, who are unable to escape the conclusions generated by the
stereotypes and generalizations. I hypothesize that it is easier for
wealthier Blacks, simply as a function and byproduct of their wealth,
to escape the stereotypes to which poor Blacks are subjected.
Consequently, as one's income increases and socioeconomic status
improves, the applicability of most of the other stereotypical attrib-
utes (education, crime, drug use, welfare, etc.) decreases. Wealth
and its attainment become a "super-proxy" that negates the proxy
created by one's status as a Black. To some extent, then, Black
individuals are able to overcome their Blackness through economic
attainment and success (as measured by white norms).
Hence, the Black urban poor are unable to escape from their
necessitous circumstances because they lack the financial where-
withal to defeat the proxy associated with the color of their skin.
Upper-income Blacks, however, have the means to diminish their
racial identification with the disfavored group. If access to money
and opportunity were equally provided, there would be little or no
need for the interventionist model of discrimination because, to a
large extent, the market model would work, albeit along class lines
rather than race lines. That state of affairs would be normatively
acceptable, assuming one accepts the current method of economic
allocation in American society.
C. The Effects of Discrimination on Human Capital
Professor Sunstein has also demonstrated that the productivity
of Blacks is "endogenous to, or a product of, discrimination in the
labor market."' 0 He argues that to some extent Blacks, like other
subordinated persons, have internalized the existence of discrimina-
tion in their decisions or choices to invest in human capital.
Existing patterns of discrimination may cause Blacks to invest less
in education, 1 1 employment programs, and other activities whose
" See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
100 Sunstein, supra note 47, at 29.
101 Elsewhere I have argued that the discriminatory manipulation of evaluative
standards causes Black males to overinvest in resources with the potential to lead to
a professional sports career and undcrinvest in those resources that could lead to
professional or academic careers. See generally Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Societal
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payoff is controlled by exogenous market factors than would
similarly situated whites. Blacks may opt for this apparently self-
defeating behavior because the expected payoffs from those
investments, affected negatively by discrimination, are less than
those of similarly situated whites.
10 2
Underinvestment in human capital has a greater effect on the
Black poor than on wealthier Blacks. To some extent, being a suc-
cessful Black, at least as measured in terms of income, means mak-
ing a decision to invest in human capital and seeing that decision
pay off. Consequently, no argument is made that Blacks will not
invest in human capital; quite to the contrary, the argument is made
that those already on the bottom, subject to the worst discrimina-
tion and its effects (downtrodden neighborhoods, poor schools,
exposure to crime and drugs, and so forth) will recognize that the
investment required to overcome their horrific environment is enor-
mous and that the odds of escaping are relatively remote. Thus,
they will make little or no investment in the resources that could
provide an avenue for escape. Because discrimination is present
and affects the market, however, these decisions to invest less in
human capital may actually be Pareto efficient or optimal.1'0
One would anticipate that the same phenomenon would occur
to some degree with respect to investments in housing. If, as noted
above, a large percentage of Blacks are consigned to inferior,
segregated housing in a cycle that creates an underclass from which
there is little hope of escape,0 4 it makes very little sense for these
same Blacks to increase their investments in their homes, either for
their own use or for resale.
For those planning to stay in the neighborhood, the externali-
ties10 5 created by the other ghetto dwellers who do not similarly
Evaluative Standards Skew Career Choices and Call for the Aggressive Use of Affir-
mative Action: "Why Shaquille Chooses to Play Basketball or Tell Jokes Instead of
Going to Law School" (Oct. 15, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
1 See Sunstein, supra note 47, at 29 ("Decisions about education, training, drug
use, tradeoffs between work and leisure, and employment programs will be affected
by existing patterns of discrimination. In a market that contains such discrimination,
blacks and women will invest relatively less in such programs.").
10s See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMIcS 45 (1988)
(describing "Pareto efficiency" as a condition where "there is no way to make a
change that benefits someone without harming someone else").
104 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
105 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 103, at 45 ("[A] harmful externality is defined
as a cost or benefit that the voluntary actions of one or more people imposes or
confers on a third party or parties without their consent.").
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invest in upgrading or maintaining their investment in housing
negatively impacts the value of the housing of those who do. That
fact, coupled with the almost universal reality that ghetto housing
is substandard, supports the idea that it makes little economic sense
for the ghetto dweller to invest in maintaining a standard of housing
above that of the other ghetto inhabitants; this is a variant of the
idea of a "race to the bottom."
1 06
In contrast, those ghetto residents who do maintain or increase
their investment in housing face a suboptimal return as a result of
discrimination and its pernicious effects. Instead of reaping a profit
upon resale and moving, as per the American dream, to a bigger
house in a better neighborhood, discrimination consigns these
unfortunate souls to remain forever in a market that does not fully
value their investment.1 0 7 Thus, the cycle of segregated neighbor-
hoods is reinforced by the market, which creates endogenous
economic incentives for the maintenance and expansion of such
neighborhoods. t' Consequently, although the cycle of poverty
discussed above may be a factor in perpetuating the ghetto and
segregation, the market and the forces it generates must also be
recognized as causative factors in the maintenance of segregated
residential housing.
The end result of these investment decisions is that the poor
remain trapped in the cycle of poverty while the relatively well-off
exit at a far greater rate.'0 9 As one commentator has observed:
"0 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theoy of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 469 n.1 (1987) (discussing the origin of
the phrase "race to the bottom" in the context of competition among states for
corporate chartering revenues and a consequent laxity in corporate law).
107 Massey and Denton hypothesize that Blacks who attempt to move what I will
characterize as "incrementally" in the market- from one level of housing to the next
or from one neighborhood (segregated ghetto) to the adjacent integrated neighbor-
hood-are doomed to fail if their goal is to live in a better or integrated neighborhood
because frequently the ghetto simply expands to incorporate the adjacent neighbor-
hood that is the target of tie incremental move. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
3, at 70 ("Often black 'suburbanization' only involves the expansion of an urban
ghetto across a city line and does not reflect a larger process of racial integration.").
108 See Sunstein, supra note 47, at 29 (noting the existence of this "vicious circle
or even spiral" and stating the "[m]arkets are the problem, not the solution").
109 Some commentators claim that one of the weaknesses of affirmative action is
that it awards valuable entitlements to, and thus benefits, those Blacks who need
assistance least-individuals at the top of the socioeconomic structure. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 73-80 (1991)
(recounting Carter's own experiences as a middle-class Black at Yale Law School;
discussing his conflicted feelings about the possibility that he benefitted from an
affirmative action admissions program despite the fact that lie did not feel
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[T]he extraordinary persistence of blacks and women in attempt-
ing to enter professions dominated by whites and men is one of
the most striking phenomena of the post-World War II period.
Blacks and women frequently appear to invest huge amounts of
human capital.., in sectors that treat them inhospitably. In fact,
some people in some circumstances [for example, higher income
or wealthier Blacks] respond to discrimination by increasing rather
than decreasing their investments in human capital.1
Those on the margin, the Black middle class on the precipice of
success with access to more income, better schools, and better
neighborhoods, will be in a better position to invest in human
capital or housing. They also have a better chance of making a
successful investment given the attributes they begin with in their
endeavor.
D. Synergistic Effects
Briefly, I have noted Professor Sunstein's observation that in a
world plagued by discrimination the labor market produces and
reinforces a cycle that leads to underinvestment in human capi-
tal.' Moreover, I attempted to demonstrate that this cycle may
help create the underclass. 2 In this subpart, I explore Professor
Sunstein's observations on the consequential, or synergistic, effects
of market-based (or "economically rational") discrimination on low-
income housing and its tendency to perpetuate segregation.
As Professor Sunstein demonstrates, the market factors
discussed thus far, such as the promotion of discrimination by third
parties, the presence of statistically or economically rational
discrimination, and the resulting underinvestment in human capital,
disadvantaged by his race; and noting that most poor Blacks are not able to reap the
benefits of preferential treatment). Intuitively, it seems accurate to presuppose that
affirmative action would benefit the best and the brightest. Indeed, it would seem
odd if affirmative action programs, say as measured by the LSAT in the law school
admissions context, ignored higher-scoring Blacks and benefitted Blacks who scored
lower on the test. The fact that the LSAT's highest correlation for performance is
socioeconomic status, even across racial lines, suggests that wealthier Blacks will
perform better than their poorer counterparts. For a discussion of these and other
issues raised by affirmative action in the law school admissions context, see Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., et al., The Efficacy of Affirmative Action in Legal Education (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author).
110 Sunstein, supra note 47, at 29-30.
. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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produce significantly more, not less, discrimination."' In a
lengthy quote worthy of reproduction, Professor Sunstein notes:
[E]ach of these effects reinforces the others in potentially powerful
ways. If there is ordinary prejudice, it will interact with statistical
discrimination so as to produce more of both. People notice events
consistent with their prejudice and disregard events that are inconsistent
with them, and the result will be more in the way of both prejudice and
statistical discrimination....
In addition, if there is prejudice and statistical discrimination,
and if third parties promote discrimination, there will be de-
creased investments in human capital. Such decreased investments
will be a perfectly reasonable response to the real world. And if
there are decreased investments in human capital, then prejudice,
statistical discrimination, and third-party effects will also increase.
Statistical discrimination will become all the more rational;
prejudice will hardly be broken down; consumers and employers
will be more likely to be discriminators.""
The effect of this synergistic cycle will, once again, fall more
harshly on the poor. As Sunstein notes, behavior that is atypical
and that does not conform to discriminatory stereotypes is mini-
mized in a way that preserves the stereotype. For example, in this
context a discriminating white man might view a successful Black
woman living in an integrated neighborhood as atypical and, pardon
the phrase, "unblack" or "un-African-American."" That is, a
Black lawyer or doctor who moves into a previously all-white
neighborhood is perceived as unblack by her white neighbors. This
is "logical" because the very traits that made her successful and
capable of moving into an integrated neighborhood-her education,
her intelligence, her professional and personal demeanor, her
career and the economic benefits that it provides-are used to
separate her from her race and her status as a Black. To do
otherwise would result in dissonance for these white discriminators
who consider Blacks inferior and who must now reconcile their
inferiority with living in close proximity (perhaps even adjacent) to
the allegedly inferior individual. This rationalization allows white
'1 See Sunstein, supra note 47, at 30-31 (citing a number of market factors that
interact with one another and effectively increase the level of discrimination in
society).
Id. (emphasis added).
"' Although this latter phrase is inelegant, for the sake of this discussion I will use
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discriminators to hold on to their prejudice and their own subjective
view of their self-esteem or status.
Professional or entrepreneurial Blacks are considered inauthen-
tically Black and frequently receive "complimentary" remarks from
their white friends such as, "Gee, I don't think of you as Black."
This statement, taken in its context, reveals how whites applaud
successful Blacks while maintaining the discriminatory belief that
Blacks are less intelligent," 6 less worthy of being coemployees,
and less worthy of being neighbors in the abstract. It also reflects
the fact that once discriminatory beliefs become entrenched in
society, either through law117 or practice,"' individuals, whether
victimizers or victims, adapt to the status quo, internalize its
contradictions, and conform their behavior so as to minimize
dissonance."
9
The people who are hurt by this synergistic effect are not the
Blacks at the top of the socioeconomic status who are viewed by
their white peers as unblack, or the exception to the rule. Rather,
those who suffer are the vast majority of the urban poor. This
group, the members of which lack the credentials, the education,
the access to employment opportunities, and the opportunities for
meaningful interaction with whites, makes socioeconomically
privileged Blacks less threatening to whites and facilitates their
acceptance by whites as unblack members of the community. The
urban poor need a vehicle that will lessen or eliminate the negative
impact of the third-party effects that promote discrimination, lessen
or stop the use of statistically or economically rational discrimina-
tion, and slow or reverse the underinvestment in human capital that
may be economically optimal on an individual basis, but is wasteful
on a social level.
Assuming that the market does not and will not work to lessen
or eradicate discrimination, and indeed may, as noted above,
reinforce discriminatory behavior in the housing market, 2 ' the
'16 For an example of this attitude, see generally MURRAY & HERNNSTEIN, supra
note 28, which attempts to explain why Blacks tend to score lower than whites on IQ
tests.
11 See, e.g., Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 427 (1856) (holding that Blacks are not
citizens of the several states "within the meaning of the Constitution of the United
States"). The Dred Scott decision was later overturned by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
18 See supra part I.A.
"9 See Sunstein, supra note 47, at 31-32.
' See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
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use of the law and the concomitant acceptance of the interventionist
model to correct discriminatory behavior may at first glance seem
to be the appropriate vehicle to combat discrimination in fields like
housing. It is to that model that I now turn.
E. The Interventionist Model
Antidiscrimination laws represent an alternative method for
combatting discrimination. Those who support this interventionist
model point to the market model, which features a lack of interven-
tion, and allege that its failure to eradicate or significantly to lessen
housing discrimination"' justifies the use of intervention model
to combat discrimination.
A major component of this thesis, known as the adaptive prefer-
ence model, is that the law is, but should not be, neutral in
facilitating market transactions because the imposition of legal rules
creates endogenous preferences that are influenced by the choice
of legal rules. 2 ' Cogently summarized, the gist of the adaptive
preference model is that preferences are heavily influenced by the
choice of legal rules used to regulate social behavior. If whites are
prohibited from discriminating against Blacks in housing by the Fair
Housing Act, they will learn over time "to 'adapt' their preferences"
to conform to the law.123  Thus, society can use the law as a
positive tool to lessen or eradicate discrimination, rather than rely
on the invisible hand of the market.
This model has much explanatory power and much support.
Intuitively it seems correct that individuals will shape or alter their
behavior to conform to the law. Although the theory has come
under attack recently for its tautological character and its failure to
specify which preferences should be enforced by the law,12 4 it
121 See supra part II.A.
" The adaptive preference theory was first put forth in JON ELSTER, SOUR
GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983) (discussing various
forms of rationality and discerning which preferences would exist in a well-ordered
society), and first found its way into the legal literature in Sunstein, supra note 79, at
1146 ("The phenomenon of adaptive preferences results from the fact that what
people want is sometimes a product of what they can get.").
12 Richard A. Epstein, Two Conceptions of Civil Rights, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring
1991, at 38, 50 (citation omitted).
124 See id. at 52 ("The hard question is which behaviors the law should seek to
legitimate with its imprimatur. A theory of adaptive preferences may give some weak
dues about individual response to legal rules, but it affords no insight as to which
rules are justified or why.").
DESTABILIZING RACE
seems quite powerful once society has determined these prefer-
ences. Moreover, I am willing to assume that the elimination of
discrimination is a preference that all reasonable persons would
support.
1 25
The problem, of course, with the adaptive preference or
interventionist model is not that the preference is not agreed upon
or subject to dispute. Quite simply, the problem is that the model
has not worked. As noted in Part I, housing discrimination has not
significantly improved in the thirty years since the enactment of the
Fair Housing Act, nor has meaningful integration been achieved
since the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.1 26 That leads to a
question of whether the interventionist model is a viable method to
eradicate discrimination or whether it should be replaced with
another model. If it is retained, then its flaws must be exposed and
corrected. If they cannot be, the interventionist model should be
jettisoned.
The problem with the interventionist model, and with the
adaptive preference theory that undergirds it, is not the theory
itself, but rather the conflict in the preferences that has heretofore
gone undetected and unexplained. To be effective, the adaptive
preference model depends on the articulation and publication of a
clear message whose value can be internalized and acted upon. The
problem with the interventionist model is that the message articu-
lated and publicized by edicts like the Fair Housing Act are incon-
sistent with other long-standing preferences established in the law.
Instead of establishing a clear preference, antidiscrimination edicts
conflict with the message perpetuated through the continued
maintenance and operation of fixed racial categories-a message that
125 This may be where Professor Epstein and I part. An argument can be made,
I assume, that discrimination is efficient if the gains obtained by the dominant group,
whites, outweigh the loss suffered by the minority group, Blacks. Perhaps that is why
American society does not adapt to the antidiscrimination preference in the Fair
Housing Act.
I reject that rationale for two reasons. First, it is difficult to measure the gains
and losses in this context because it presupposes that the market works perfectly,
which is not the case. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. Second, and
more importantly, it violates moral and philosophical precepts upon which this
democracy and western society are founded. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 3 (1971) ("Each person possesses an inviolability founded onjustice that even
the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.").
126 See supra part I. For a further discussion of the failure of integrationism, see
Johnson, supra note 5, at 1402-03 (noting the failure "to recognize and appreciate the
social realities that preclude the attainment of meaningful integration through simple
judicial or legislative fiat").
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supports the thesis that racial categories and race continue to
matter in contemporary American society.
To the extent that the new antidiscrimination preference trumps
the older discrimination preference, it does so only for economically
advantaged Blacks, for several reasons. First, those whites who
would internalize the newer preference are those who have the
capacity to incorporate the new preference most efficiently. They
do so because they are smarter, have access to better information,
and, as a logical corollary, have more wealth. More importantly,
those advantaged whites who internalize the message have less to
lose. They are protecting more assets than a property right in
whiteness.'27 That right is less relevant because they have access
to other rights and entitlements.
As long as the law continues to classify individuals as white
and Black based on rules such as the one drop of blood rule,
1 28
however, the message that race matters will continually be rein-
forced in this society. Indeed, it is logical to assume that important
things such as entitlements must turn on that characterization
because we strive so mightily to maintain the racial distinction
between whites and Blacks. This inevitably leads to discriminatory
behavior because these distinctions-that is, differences-are recog-
nized and valued.
One way to explore my contention is through an analysis of
other subordinated persons of color and related immigrant groups
in American society who are also dominated by whites, in order to
demonstrate the power of the one drop of blood rule, pheno-
type, 129 and racial discrimination. As I explain more fully else-
where, I contend that, because of both an absence of ethnicity and
a visible phenotype that largely precludes assimilation, Blacks face
a more intense form of discrimination than other racial groups that
is more difficult to escape.
130
My first contention is that Blacks largely lack an ethnic identity
that is available to whites. Subgroups of Italians, Poles, Irish, and
others exist and flourish within the white race, and these groups are
valued by society. Blacks are not allowed to have ethnicity, however,
127 For a discussion of whiteness as a property right or interest, see infra part III.
121 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
" Phenotype indicates the amalgamation of observable, visible traits possessed by
an individual. SeeJAMES C. KING, THE BIOLOGY OF RACE 20 (1981) (defining the term
in the context of examining race from a biological perspective).
150 SeeJohnson, supra note 24, at 25.
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because there are no differences recognizable among Blacks. They
are all simply viewed as "other" by whites, irrespective of their
ethnicity.'s
Secondly, the amount of melanin in one's skin, which is what I
am referring to when I use the term phenotype, is a visibly
observable trait that allows an individual to categorize others easily
and quickly. The two predominant categories are white and Black,
and, given the one drop of blood rule, white is measured by the
absence of Black blood or Black ancestors who could have created
the Black phenotype. Thus, the amount of melanin in one's skin
determines who is white and who is not,132 although even the
smallest amount is enough to place one in the Black box. That
precludes easy assimilation for the vast majority of Blacks.
133
Consequently, Blacks, unlike other minorities and immigrant
groups, face a different sort of housing discrimination than other
minority and immigrant groups because the discrimination they
must contend with is based on a factor that is not present in those
other groups.' The transaction costs required to keep Blacks
'' My contention, which I flesh out more fully in my article, Destabilizing Racial
Categorizations Based on Lessonsfrom Trademark Law, supra note 24, is that Blacks from
the Caribbean, Blacks from South America, and even Blacks from the rural southern
United States are different ethnically from urban Blacks residing in the United States,
and that this ethnicity should be acknowledged and recognized by whites as well as
Blacks.
" What is astounding about American racial classifications is that the Black/white
classificatory scheme is dichotomous. There is no mixed-race or other category that
classifies the product or progeny of a miscegenistic union. That offspring or prodigy
would be classified under the one drop of blood rule as a Black.
' It goes without saying that a few Blacks do become assimilated by "passing."
See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. It must also be recognized, however,
that passing is a relatively unique phenomenon and does not afford the same
opportunity to Blacks as it does to immigrant groups and other minorities, such as
white Hispanics, who are not phenotypically Black and can therefore more easily
assimilate into white society.
What is puzzling in this context is how Hispanic- and Asian-Americans, who are
also phenotypically distinct but in a different way, are able to assimilate and integrate
into American neighborhoods to a greater degree than African-Americans. See infra
notes 149-50 and accompanying text. For an answer to this question, see Johnson,
supra note 24, at 54 (noting the problems with multiracial categories from the
perspective of a biracial analysis).
1'4 Once again, this is puzzling because the same treatment does not apply to
Asian-Americans, the so-called "model minority." For a discussion of this fallacious
characterization, see Chew, supra note 26, at 24-45 (discussing the myth that Asian-
Americans are treated as "model" minorities and therefore do not experience the
hostility that Blacks do); see alsoJohnson, supra note 24, at 34-40 (discussing people's
perceptions of physical characteristics of race).
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separate are, as a result, lower than the costs associated with respect
to these other groups. Finally, the same feature that characterizes
Blacks as a minority group also easily identifies them as individuals
to be excluded from the community.
Evidence gathered from the experience of other minority and
immigrant groups, including Asian-Americans, bears out the thesis
that Blacks, because of the manner in which they are defined by the
one drop of blood rule and the manner in which their phenotype
precludes easy assimilation into the mainstream, white melting
pot, 3 5 also experience a different form of segregation far more
potent than that experienced by other similarly situated groups.
As Massey and Denton point out, the segregation of Black
Americans is a unique phenomenon in American history. It is
unique not because Black ghettos developed recently, but because
Blacks, unlike other immigrant and minority groups 3 6 who have
experienced the ghetto at some point before their assimilation in
American society, have remained in the ghetto and have experi-
enced the degree of hypersegregation addressed above. 3 7 For
example, Hispanics, irrespective of socioeconomic class, are much
more integrated into American cities than are Blacks. 138 The
same, and perhaps even stronger, claim can be made for Asian-
Americans.I13
Any interested party must address why other immigrant groups
are treated differently than their Black counterparts when it comes
135 For a discussion of the unique barriers that Blacks face in assimilating racially
into American society, see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
"5 I expressly omit a discussion of the plight of Native Americans and other
indigenous peoples because of a lack of data and my assumption that the United
States' previous policy of interning such peoples on reservations would skew any such
data regarding the voluntary or involuntary nature of segregation.
'3' See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the hyperseg-
regation faced by Blacks, including recent statistics, see supra notes 37-41 and
accompanying text.
'38 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 77 ("Despite their immigrant origins,
Spanish language, and high poverty rates, Hispanics are considerably more integrated
in U.S. society than are blacks.").
139 See id. at 87. In their survey of the San Francisco-Oakland metropolitan area,
which contains the largest concentration of Asians in the United States, Massey and
Denton observed that
the Asian-white segregation index fell from 64 in the lowest income category
to 52 in the highest (compared with respective black-white indices of 86 and
79). These contrasts were repeated in cities throughout the United States:
... Asian segregation generally begins at a relatively modest level among
the poor and falls steadily as income rises.
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to residential housing patterns and must identify the cultural factors
(racism, poverty, the creation and maintenance of an underclass and
its resultant pathology of crime, illegitimacy, undereducation, and
governmental dependency) that produce this disparate treatment.
One obvious response is the intense discrimination that Blacks
confront in the housing market. Discrimination, like other
irrational preferences, does not appear in a uniform fashion with
respect to all targeted groups.
Hence, given the unique position of Blacks in American society
resulting from their enforced enslavement and subsequent incorpo-
ration (not integration) into American society, one finds a hierarchy
of discrimination whereby different groups suffer differential
degrees of discrimination, with whites at the top of the hierarchy
and Blacks on the bottom. 4 ' Other minorities, such as Asian-
Americans or Hispanic-Americans, fall somewhere in the mid-
dle.
141
Legal rules must recognize that this hierarchy of race exists and
that it has a correspondingly hierarchical impact on housing
opportunities based on racial or ethnic group identity. Once the
law has recognized this fact, it must create a preference for antidis-
crimination without reifying racial distinctions through the guise of
respecting racial differences. This goal can be accomplished by
destabilizing stable and fixed racial classifications. 4" This is the
best way to help the urban poor, both white and Black, who are the
victims of these classifications.
Before turning to destabilization, however, Part III details how
stable racial classifications have created a property right in white-
140 To defend such a thesis, however, would require a substantial investigation to
establish that favored and disfavored minorities exist, and that those in the position
to discriminate-whites-make conscious discriminatory choices based on the ethnic
or racial makeup of the individual or group being discriminated against. Such an
argument is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I argue that Blacks are
differentially discriminated against because they are less able to assimilate and
integrate themselves into white American society than other minorities based on their
phenotype and other visible characteristics. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying
text (suggesting that racial segregation reinforces categorizations that are increasingly
difficult to base solely on physical characteristics, and discussing the phenomenon of
"passing").
143 Some commentators, however, suggest that the extent of discrimination
suffered by so-called "model" minority groups such as Asian-Americans is no different
than that suffered by Blacks. See, e.g., Chew, supra note 26, at 8-24 (noting the many
instances of discrimination against Asian-Americans, including "lynching[s], race riots,
and slavery").
142 See infra part IV.
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ness that whites (poor whites in particular) seek to protect, in part,
through the maintenance of segregated neighborhoods.
III. WHITENESS AS PROPERTY AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE URBAN POOR
It really is quite remarkable: Blacks live with Blacks and whites
live with whites.1 3 Metaphorically one might imagine these two
communities in the following way: Picture a black circle represent-
ing the Black community and a white circle representing the white
community. The white circle is significantly larger than the black
circle. Neither circle overlaps. Now picture a green circle repre-
senting socioeconomic status. This circle is roughly the same size
as the white circle. Unlike the other two fields, however, the green
circle is multishaded. The center of the circle is light green; toward
the circumference, the circle becomes a darker, more verdant shade
of green. The light green shade represents a relatively low level of
socioeconomic status, whereas the dark green shade represents a
relatively high level of socioeconomic success.
If one places the green circle over the white circle, one sees that
the white community is relatively evenly distributed between the
light center of the green circle and the more verdant outer rim.
When one places the green circle over the black circle, however, one
sees that the light center of the green circle covers almost all of the
black circle. The portion of the black circle that is covered by the
darker, more verdant portion of the green circle is minuscule.
If these overlapping circles represent neighborhoods, what one
finds is that, where the dark portion of the green circle overlaps
with the black circle (DGB for Dark Green Black) and the dark
outer rim of the green circle overlaps with the white circle (WDG
for White Dark Green), the dark portion of the green circle that
covers both the black (DGB) and white (WDG) circles represents an
143 1 reiterate that my focus on Blacks to the exclusion of other minorities in no
way diminishes or ignores the segregated residential patterns experienced by other
subordinated groups in American society. Residential segregation negatively impacts
all subordinated groups to some extent; however, Blacks are the dominant and
prototypical minority group and, as discussed previously, Blacks face a higher degree
of segregation than other minority groups. See Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A.
Denton, Trends in the Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970-
1980, 52 AM. Soc. REv. 802, 817-23 (1987) (examining the reasons behind the
relatively high level of Black segregation as compared to Hispanic and Asian-
American segregation); see also supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing
hypersegregation and its effects on Blacks).
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integrated neighborhood. In other words, where the DGB and the
WDG circles intersect, one finds relatively wealthy Blacks living with
relatively wealthy whites. What is puzzling, of course, is why the
LGB (or light green black) and the LGW (or light green white)
circles do not overlap to any significant extent. Given the capitalis-
tic nature of our society and the prevalence of poor rather than rich
individuals, one would expect the LGB and the LGW circles to
overlap significantly. 44
Indeed, many scholars find it remarkable that poor whites and
poor Blacks do not live in racially integrated neighborhoods.
1 45
Nevertheless, much of the scholarship produced by the leading
empiricists in the field supports the tentative conclusion that the
level of individual socioeconomic status is largely irrelevant to the
level of racial integration.1
46
Massey and Denton, in their pioneering work, have taken a
rather odd approach to this issue by analyzing the race and class
issue from the perspective of upper- or higher-income Blacks. By
examining the alleged lack of integration of higher-income Blacks
into wealthy white neighborhoods, Massey and Denton conclude
that race dominates over class and that socioeconomic status is
irrelevant as a correlative or variable in explaining the extent of
segregation or, conversely, the absence of integration:
'4" See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 84 ("In the market-driven, status-
conscious society of the United States, affluent families live in different neighbor-
hoods than poor families, and to the extent that blacks are poor and whites are
affluent, the two groups will tend to be physically separated.... ."). Because the poor
live with the poor and the rich live with the rich, and there are clearly more poor
than rich persons, one would expect to see more integration amongst the poor.
Moreover, because, according to the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994,
approximately 12% of whites (about 25 million people) and roughly 33% of Blacks
(about 10 million people) have household incomes below the poverty level, one would
expect to see these 35 million poor individuals living in dilapidated but integrated
housing. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1994, at 17, 48 (114th ed. 1994) (reporting U.S.
population by race and socioeconomic characteristics of the white and Black
populations as of the end of 1992, the latest year for which accurate figures are
available).
141 See, e.g., Potter, supra note 15, at 1169 ("This finding does not correspond with
the theory that racial housing patterns are attributed to income differences. If




See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 240-41 n.28 ("Because racial
segregation does not decline with rising socioeconomic status, out-movement from
poor black neighborhoods certainly has not been to white areas.").
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[W]hen one considers residential segregation, ... race clearly
predominates.... Even if black incomes had continued to rise
through the 1970s, segregation would not have declined: no
matter how much blacks earned they remained spatially separated
from whites. In 1980, as in the past, money did not buy entry into
white neighborhoods of American cities.
4 7
Massey and Denton's focus on economically privileged Blacks
and the alleged failure of these individuals to integrate white
communities is particularly puzzling because of the relatively small
number of wealthy Blacks. 4 ' The more interesting question is
why poor whites and poor Blacks do not live in integrated commu-
nities. Accepting for a moment Massey and Denton's thesis that
economic success does not lead to integration because of racism,
the conclusion that racism prevents the integration of poor
neighborhoods is not obviously true.
Massey and Denton's conclusion that race, rather than class, is
the key factor leading to segregated neighborhoods supports the
thesis that the racial typologies that define racial classifications are
the primary factors that lead whites of all socioeconomic classes to
discriminate against Blacks and establish segregated housing
patterns. Furthermore, Massey and Denton's conclusion that even
the poorest Hispanic- and Asian-Americans experience less
segregation in many large U.S. cities than the most affluent
Blacks14 9 is consonant with my thesis that the one drop of blood
rule creates a property right in whiteness that whites protect by
maintaining an artificial dichotomy between whites and Blacks based
on phenotype to which no other minority group is subject.
150
147 Id. at 85.
148 Only 16.1% of Black families (equalling approximately 1.3 million persons)
earned over $50,000 for the year 1992, as compared to 35.8% of white families
(equalling approximately 20.7 million persons). See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
supra note 144, at 48.
149 See MASSEY & DENTON, sup a note 3, at 87 (stating that "Hispanic and Asian
segregation generally begins at a relatively modest level among the poor and falls
steadily as income rises"); see also supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text
(discussing the different experiences of Blacks in U.S. cities relative to other minority
groups).
" The maintenance of a rigid color line between whites and Blacks based on the
one drop of blood rule precludes easy assimilation of Blacks into white society, an
option that Hispanics, who may be of any race, possess. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 3, at 62; see also infra part IV. Likewise, the phenotype or skin color of most
Asian-Americans is similar to that of whites. As a result, whites may be more
accepting of Asian-Americans than of Blacks. But see Chew, supra note 26, at 24-25
(describing problems unique to the Asian-American community, such as overgeneral-
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Massey and Denton's thesis may be flawed, however, to the
extent that it does not capture the effect that income, and what it
signifies to whites, has on discrimination, and what that means for
the different experiences of poor Blacks and their relatively
wealthier counterparts. The differential experience between poor
and wealthy Blacks suggests that the key to explaining the continued
persistence of segregated neighborhoods thirty years after the
enactment of the Fair Housing Act is racial identification.
5 1
Taking Massey and Denton's data at face value, it proves too
little. Their sweeping conclusions about race and class and the lack
of integration for all Blacks, including high-income Blacks, do not
take into account Massey and Denton's own work demonstrating
that more affluent white neighborhoods contain a higher percentage
of Blacks than white working class (poor) and middle-income
communities. 2 Thus, although the power of racism may explain
why Blacks remain segregated, it does not explain why Blacks are
generally accepted more readily in white affluent neighborhoods
than in poor ones.
Consequently, I wish to modify Massey and Denton's thesis to
acknowledge that race is still the predominant factor that causes
segregation. Massey and Denton attempt to demonstrate that
segregation is an intensifier of poverty. 5 I, on the contrary, posit
that the existence of wealth, because of the attributes associated
with it, and the signals it sends to monitoring whites about the
ethnicity of the individual and the degree to which that individual
has been assimilated, 154 serves as a vehicle through which a limited
number of Blacks do move into and integrate affluent white
communities.
Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the theory that racism is the
predominant variable that brings about and perpetuates segregation
to presuppose that socioeconomic status presents different
integrative opportunities and experiences for wealthy and poor
Blacks. Along that line, it is not surprising that there is "less
racism" in affluent rather than poor and middle-class white com-
munities.'55 Given the sheer numbers of poor and middle-class
ization and negative stereotyping of social/behavioral characteristics).
151 See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
'
52 See Douglas S. Massey et al., The Effect of Residential Segregation on Black Social
and Economic Well-Being, 66 Soc. FORCES 29, 41-44 (1987) (analyzing data compiled
during the 1980 census in Philadelphia).
15s See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 118-25.
See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
15 See e.g., Potter, supra note 15, at 1169 (suggesting that affluent whites do not
1995] 1639
1640 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1595
Blacks and the relatively small number of affluent Blacks, 156 it
stands to reason that wealthy whites can be less racist because the
"market" will do the exclusionary work for them.
Furthermore, when the economic success of the affluent Black
is viewed as positively correlated to assimilation into white norms
and values (that is, the Black is not a "gang-banger" or an unem-
ployed "welfare cheat" who will drive down property values), the
racial identification and its threat to the white community's values
become subsumed. The class standing of those individuals situated
within the community provides prestige that precludes the need for
other forms of group identification or assimilation. In other words,
merely being a resident of Danbury, Connecticut, San Francisco,
California, or Bergen-Passaic, New Jersey157 may be enough of an
indicia of attainment and success that racial identification becomes
largely irrelevant. Green, and I mean money, rather than black or
white, becomes the operative color that builds solidarity and
promotes exclusivity.
The transformative effects of economic status, combined with
the fact that the educational levels of those in affluent communities
may reduce racism, 158 leads to the conclusion that the experiences
of wealthy Blacks, or at least the opportunities afforded to wealthy
Blacks, are different than those of their poorer counterparts. In
this respect, money whitens. 159 What it fails to fully explain is why
feel threatened by Black entry into their communities because they realize few Blacks
will have the economic ability to do so).
16 For example, the percentage of Black families that have household incomes
below the poverty rate is 33.1%, whereas the percentage of similar white families is
12.2%. See Margaret L. Usdansky, Few Feel Economic Rebound, USA TODAY, Oct. 7,
1994, at 2A; supra note 144; see also Judith L. Howard & Gregory Katz, Finding
Common Ground: U.S. Integration Problems Foreshadow Challenge for South Africa,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 15, 1992, at 22 ("Nationwide, census data also show a
worsening split between the black poor and the black affluent. Recent figures show
that although the percentage of high income black families in 1990 had more than
doubled since 1967, the proportion of blacks in the lowest income groups grew by 50
percent."); see also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 144, at 17, 48 (presenting
similar figures on the number of Black households below the poverty level).
157 Danbury, San Francisco, and Bergen-Passaic are three relatively affluent U.S.
communities. See, e.g., Seattle Area Ranks 27th in Per-Capita Income, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 4, 1990, at D7 ("The area in Connecticut comprising Bridgeport, Stamford,
Norwalk and Danbury retained its top ranking, with per-capita personal income of
$29,084.... Following the Connecticut suburbs of New York City were San
Francisco, $26,309; Bergen-Passaic, N.J., $25,388 . . ").
1" An inverse correlation between level of educational attainment and racism has
been documented. See Massey et al., supra note 152, at 53 (presenting survey data
showing that prejudice decreases with education).
159 See F.JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? ONE NATION'S DEFINITION 101 (1991).
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poor whites feel threatened by the prospect of living with similarly
economically situated poor Blacks. The fact that there are more
Blacks who are willing and able to live in these neighborhoods (the
sheer threat of numbers) does not explain why these whites are so
hostile to the entry of any Blacks. Potter also notes the paradox
that is at the center of my Article:
[U]pper classes do not feel threatened by black entry, since they
realize that few blacks possess the resources to move into the most
affluent communities. In contrast, lower and middle income
whites do feel threatened by blacks as they realize that blacks
possess both the economic means and the desire to assimilate into
the lower and middle income areas.
60
Thus, although numbers may explain why the "integration
threat" is less credible for wealthier whites, it does not explain the
continued existence of this perceived threat. More importantly, it
does not explain the behavior of poor whites, who almost fervidly
defend their segregated neighborhoods against racial minorities and
who rapidly flee when one or two Black households move into these
previously all-white areas. 161 For an explanation, I turn to a
theory in which whiteness is viewed as a property right that whites
seek to preserve via segregated neighborhoods. Viewing whiteness
as a property right sheds light on why poor Blacks and poor whites
do not inhabit the same area and why poverty intensifies segrega-
tion. 1
6 2
The contention that whiteness is a valuable property right is not
a new or novel claim. The vigor with which white neighborhoods
Davis notes that, in Brazil,
as people climb the class ladder by educational and economic success, their
racial designations often change. No secrecy or change of residence is
needed to "pass" to another racial identity, and it is a common aspect of
upward mobility.... [Cilass can have more weight than physical traits in
determining racial classification. Brazilian census estimates for racial
categories thus provide better information on the class structure than on
racial composition ....
Id.; see also SOWELL, supra note 30, at 101 ("As in much of Latin America, wealth
facilitated acceptance as 'white' [in Brazil], and at one time official certificates of
whiteness were for sale.").
160 Potter, supra note 15, at 1169 (citing Massey et al., supra note 152, at 51).
161 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 38 ("Given the intensity of black
demand and the depths of white prejudice, the entry of a relatively small number of
black settlers would quickly surpass the threshold of white tolerance and set off a
round of racial turnover.").
162 Cf id. at 118-25 (contending that segregation intensifies poverty and not vice
versa).
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protect the whiteness of their communities is clear evidence that
whiteness has value, at least to whites. 6 This notion that white-
ness is a very valuable property right worthy of protection has also
been the subject of legal discourse in academia.
1 64
Although whiteness may appropriately be viewed as a property
right, the benefits associated with that right are not necessarily
material in an economic sense.1 6 1 My supposition is that poor
whites cling to and protect their whiteness as a mark of distinction
because it is the only significant and viable asset they possess.
166
The notion of residential integration challenges that whiteness.
The homogeneity of the neighborhood's racial identity reinforces
the privilege created by the property right in whiteness. Having no
other significant asset, poor whites gain a benefit from maintaining
their separate status. They can operate under the fiction that they
choose to live without Blacks. That choice, and the power that it
gives them, is what is protected by the urban white poor in
maintaining segregated neighborhoods.
Having the same or less socioeconomic status as other Blacks is,
in effect, negated by the "privilege" of living in a segregated
neighborhood with other whites. Living in a separate community
creates a market premium that not only provides a benefit to its
white inhabitants but also reinforces the attribute that provides the
premium. In this way, the poorest white enjoys a privilege that is
16 Cf. Gotanda, supra note 8, at 59-60 (arguing that complete assimilation of all
races would be "cultural genocide").
' See, e.g., Frances L. Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil
Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 n.129 (1989) (arguing that under
the current political, economic, and cultural system whites "overwhelmingly control
power and material resources"); Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1595, 1602, 1608 (1989) (noting that affirmative action
policies threaten the property interests enjoyed by whites); Harris, supra note 8, at
1707 (discussing the negative effects of the concept of whiteness as a property value).
'
65 See Harris, supra note 8, at 1741 ("[E]ven when the white working class did not
collect increased pay as part of white privilege, there were real advantages not paid
in direct income: whiteness still yielded what Du Bois termed a 'public and psycho-
logical wage' vital to white workers." (citing W.E.B. Du BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION
700 (photo. reprint 1976) (1935))).
166 See id. at 1743-44. Professor Harris argues:
Owning white identity as property affirmed the self-identity and liberty of
whites and, conversely, denied the self-identity and liberty of Blacks .... The
concept of whiteness was carefully protected because so much was
contingent upon it. Whiteness conferred on its owners aspects of
citizenship that were all the more valued because they were denied to
others.
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superior to the wealthiest Black and, more importantly, one that can
be destroyed by living in proximity with poor Blacks.
Professor McAdams's work on cooperation and conflict supports
this thesis.' 67 After establishing that members of socially connect-
ed groups, those with a "shared trait" such as whiteness, cooperate
to produce intragroup status and esteem, 6 ' Professor McAdams
makes a point that is integral to the maintenance and existence of
segregated neighborhoods, arguing that the flip side of intragroup
cooperation (between whites) is the facilitation of intergroup
competition (whites versus Blacks) and conflict.
Given intra-group cooperation, there will be more inter-group
conflict. Status is both an additional means of ensuring intra-group
cooperation and a new end of intra-group cooperation, and in both
ways it contributes to conflict between groups. Given that social
groups are often in material conflict, the desire for intra-group
status means that individuals will cooperate more effectively in
such disputes, i.e., groups will be more effective "combatants"
whenever material conflict arises. More importantly, the very
mechanism that facilitates greater intra-group cooperation will
ensure a new form of conflict: competition for inter-group
status.
169
Race-that is, whiteness-is the vehicle through which social
status or esteem is achieved. 7 ° In order to maintain its value it
must be protected. One vehicle for maintenance is the use of
segregated neighborhoods in which members contribute materially
to intragroup status by refusing to sell or live in proximity to Blacks
and, to a lesser degree, other minorities. Moreover, segregated
neighborhoods enhance the property right in whiteness because the
very exclusivity of the neighborhood (the fact that no blacks live
there) raises the intergroup status of whites, thereby lowering the
intergroup status of Blacks who are excluded because of their
perceived inferior racial status.
171
16 7 See McAdams, supra note 21, at 25-26 (arguing that, because individuals
recognize that their social esteem is based on evaluations of the groups with which
they share observable traits, they are concerned that their groups be held in esteem,
particularly in relation to other groups).
"a See id. at 37 ("[I]ndividuals care particularly for esteem within their socially-
connected groups; even without a central authority, individuals tend to provide
esteem to those who contribute to the welfare of such groups; and this process of
esteem allocation facilitates wider social norms that directly and indirectly bring about
further cooperation.").
169 Id. at 38.
17 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
... See McAdams, supra note 21, at 60 (arguing that the recognition of differences
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Professor McAdams postulates that the discriminatory and racist
behavior that creates segregated neighborhoods is "an especially
virulent and pathological form of status production ... by which
one group seeks to produce esteem for itself by lowering the status
of another group." 172  Neighborhoods become an important
vehicle both for the production of the shared trait and, more
importantly, in overcoming free-rider problems that have the
potential for destroying the status produced by the shared trait.173
Racially segregated neighborhoods, therefore, act as efficient
vehicles for the production of racial discrimination because by
aligning the social and trait-groups in a defined geographic space
they eliminate free-rider problems.
Moreover (and consonant with my thesis), in the status produc-
tion model discrimination is "an investment in the production of
status." 1 74  As such, it is a cost-effective investment for poor
whites, who, by refusing to live in integrated neighborhoods,
acquire and maintain self-esteem in their interest in whiteness.
McAdams argues that housing and employment discrimination
constitute "the most productive means of subordination and
therefore induce the greatest 'investment' by whites .... [E]xcluding
blacks from neighborhoods is not only a very public symbol of their
subordinated status, but denies to them the material benefits of
reciprocity that may arise among neighbors." 75 Indeed, because
whiteness may be the only significant asset lower-class whites
possess, they may allow wealthier whites to free ride on their
discriminatory behavior even as these wealthy whites decry such
behavior.
176
Segregated neighborhoods also enhance or reinforce the way
that racial categorization establishes the intragroup's shared trait of
whiteness. As long as racial classification remains dichotomous,
based on phenotype (race) creates a group identification and status that is enhanced
by lowering the status of individuals possessing different phenotypical traits).
"7 Id. at 58.
1"5 See id. at 62-63 (arguing that social connection eliminates the free-rider
problem).1"4 Id. at 85 (emphasis omitted).
175 Id. at 106.
176 See id. at 93 (arguing that "high-status whites who condemn low-status whites
for their discrimination may gain more" by doing so "than by investing in the
subordination of... minorities," and positing that "certain classes of whites may
enjoy free-riding on the status other whites secure and then further increase their
status by subordinating those whites for being discriminatory").
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dividing people into whites and others,177 some way of defining
the shared trait that characterizes the white intragroup is necessary.
Within the wide variety of skin tones or phenotypes, there are
individuals who visually are "racially indeterminate." I contend that
in a world without fixed racial classifications, defining who is white
and, conversely, who is other or nonwhite, is not as easy as it might
seem. Consider the phenomenon of "passing," in which individuals
who would be classified as Black pursuant to the one drop of blood
rule pass as whites based on their phenotype. Racially segregated
neighborhoods, however, provide and reinforce racial definitions or
categorizations that, to an extent, preclude passing. An individual
from an inner-city ghetto is presumed to be Black irrespective of
phenotype. Similarly, one residing in an all-white suburb is
presumed to be white based on residence. Thus the instability of
racial definitions based on phenotype, which in turn destabilizes the
one drop of blood rule, leads quite naturally to the use of proxies
to determine who is authentically white and who is not. Because
phenotype alone does not automatically consign individuals into one
group or the other, the desire to make sure that individuals are
assigned to certain groups creates policing problems. Residence in
certain neighborhoods serves as an easy vehicle with which to police
racial boundaries.
My contention might seem improbable at first glance, but a
lengthy quote, worthy of repeating, captures the essence of my
claim:
Though [Woody] often proclaimed his blackness, and though he
had a Negro grandparent on each side of his family, he neverthe-
less looked to all the world like your typical white boy. Everyone,
on first meeting him, assumed as much. I did, too, when we began
to play together nearly a decade earlier, just after I had moved
into the middle-class neighborhood called Park Manor, where
Woody's family had been living for some time.
There were a number of white families on our block when we
first arrived; within a couple of years they had all been replaced by
aspiring black families like our own. I often wondered why
Woody's parents never moved. Then I overheard his mother
declare to one of her new neighbors, "We just wouldn't run from
our own kind," a comment that befuddled me at the time.
Somewhat later... my mother explained how someone could be
black though he or she looked white. She told me about people
177 See infra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
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like that in our own family-second cousins living in a fashionable
suburb on whom one would never dare simply to drop in, because
they were "passing for white." ... It dawned on me after this
conversation with my mother that Woody's parents must have
been passing for white in preintegration Park Manor. The
neighborhood's changing racial composition had confronted them
with a moment of truth.
178
"Passing" is a phenomenon with which many Blacks are familiar.
As noted above, passing occurs when a Black with visibly white
features, such as fair skin and straight hair, passes herself off as a
white person. 17 This act of racial self-denial and abdication was a
consequence of the positive value, and all the rights and privileges
pertaining thereto, associated with whiteness.
8 0
Hence, preserving racial identity in a world in which passing
becomes possible-a world in which phenotype does not correlate
with the one drop rule-creates error costs in maintaining and
assigning racial classifications. When some are defined as Black by
the one drop of blood rule, but are visibly white, problems arise.
From the other perspective, when millions of people who perceive
themselves as whites have more than one drop of Black blood
because of their remote Black ancestry, 181 strict adherence to the
one drop rule becomes problematic because it threatens the
maintenance of white racial identity. One way to alleviate the
problem is through the use of other symbols that correlate with
racial identification, which has the effect of sending visible signals
of racial identity irrespective of phenotype. The transaction costs
of racial classification can thereby be reduced if geographic location
correlates with racial identity.
Racial categories become more fixed and absolute, and trans-
action costs in maintaining these fixed categories decrease, in an
environment in which the person's address or neighborhood mem-
bership becomes a proxy for race. Not only does neighborhood
become a proxy for race, but it also has an internalizing effect on
1"8 Glenn C. Loury, Free at Last? A Personal Perspective on Race and Identity in
America, in LURE AND LOATHING, supra note 8, at 1, 2-3.
19 For an excellent account of passing, see Harris, supra note 8, at 1710-14.
See id. at 1713-14 (noting that "the set of assumptions, privileges, and benefits
that accompany the status of being white have become a valuable asset that whites
sought to protect and that those who passed sought to attain-by fraud if necessary").
18 See SOWELL, supra note 30, at 16 (stating that in the United States "more than
three-quarters of the black population have at least one white ancestor, while tens of
millions of whites have at least one black ancestor-and it is not uncommon for either
blacks or whites to have a native American Indian ancestor").
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its inhabitants. If inhabitants of different racial categories reside in
different neighborhoods, these inhabitants can learn very early what
race they are supposed to identify with and what norms and values
are associated with that race. They learn to accept and value the
extent of the differences because of the absence of the other.
Thus, one of the functions of segregated neighborhoods is
educative, but not educative in ways that are explicitly racist. An
example will perhaps clarify my thesis. Think of two cities, one
racially integrated and one segregated. In a world without explicit
racism, a world in which there are no theories that one race is
intellectually or in any other way inferior to another race (race
being based on skin color or phenotype),8 2 it seems quite plausi-
ble to assume that in the integrated neighborhood different skin
colors would seem largely irrelevant. I find it hard to believe that
one would think differently of other people in the integrated
neighborhood because of their skin color. It is extremely likely that
skin color in that neighborhood would be largely irrelevant, treated
like eye color, 18 3 a trait upon which no entitlement or anything
else important would turn.
Compare that neighborhood with the two separate neighbor-
hoods in which an equal number of whites and Blacks reside. Even
in the absence of overt racism, I find it just as hard to believe that
the inhabitants of the two neighborhoods would not notice differ-
ence, that everyone else in their neighborhood is like them (thereby
creating "us") and that everyone else in the other neighborhood is
different (thereby creating "them").
Having demonstrated that whiteness is a valuable property right
that is protected through the maintenance of racially segregated
neighborhoods, the question remains regarding what can be done
to eliminate whiteness as a positive value worth defending. As I
detail in Part IV, whiteness only has significant value when placed
in contradistinction to Blackness. Hence, by destabilizing Blackness,
whiteness likewise becomes destabilized leading, hopefully, to a
world in which racial differences are minimized. In such a world,
residential housing segregation would serve no value and protect no
182 Cf, e.g., MURRAY & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 276-80 (presenting data
supporting the argument that whites score higher than Blacks on IQ tests).
183 See Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 604 ("A nonracist society would be one in
which the race of an individual would be the functional equivalent of the eye color
of individuals in our society today. In our society no basic political rights and
obligations are determined on the basis of eye color.").
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interest. Before we discuss how we would secure such a world,
however, we must address the failure of traditional approaches to
eliminate discrimination. Those approaches, I contend in Part IV,
fail because they ignore the power that race and racial identification
exerts in this society. Until that power is confronted through the
destabilization that I postulate, each approach will continue to fail
to remediate the segregated housing patterns that in turn reify the
existence and use of separate racial classifications.
IV. DESTABILIZING THE CONCEPTION OF RACE
One intractable puzzle that has intrigued me has to do with the
persistence of a dichotomous model of racial classification in
American society. When one examines how race is constructed and
defined in our society, it is startling to note how racial categories
neatly divide into two camps: white and Black. In this society,
when it comes to matters of color, there is no in-between for
individuals who are not either 100% white (if that can be defined as
the total absence of Blacks as ancestors) or 100% Black (if that can
be defined as the total absence of whites as ancestors).8 4 In
particular, unlike other societies, i s5 current American society
refuses to recognize a mixed-race or mulatto category that encom-
passes those individuals who are the products of a "mixed-union or
marriage"' between a white and a Black.' In this society,
184 By focusing on Blacks, I do not mean to diminish or ignore the same duality
as it applies to other classifications based on what I will loosely term as ethnicity or
race. The same duality or dichotomous classificatory scheme exists with other races
or ethnic classifications.
185 See, e.g., SOWELL, supra note 30, at 95-107 (discussing the recognition of a
mixed-race category in the Caribbean and South America). Moreover, some societies
made the practice of naming the offspring of mixed unions an art form. See MAGNUS
MORNER, RACE MIXTURE IN THE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 58 (1967). Morner
presents a table ranking racial categories denoting ancestry in New Spain (Mexico)
during the 18th century. The table ranks 16 such mixtures, starting with the off-
spring of a male Spaniard and a female Indian, which is characterized as mestizo, and
concluding with the offspring of a coyote mestizo male and a mulatto female, which is
characterized as ahi te esids.
" The children of mixed-race unions will no doubt increase in number as
interracial unions or marriages increase. The New York Times recently reported that
some offspring of interracial marriages have begun to complain that the present
federal racial classification categories do not adequately reflect ethnic diversity. See
Steven A. Holmes, U.S. Urged to Reflect Wider Diversity in Racial and Ethnic Classifica-
tions, N.Y. TIMES,July 8, 1994, at A18 (noting that officials expect such complaints to
grow in number "in the coming years as the number of interracial marriages rises").
The report further noted that "[t]he number of interracial unions increased from 0.4
percent of all marriages in 1960 to 2.2 percent in 1992." Id.
187 See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 8, at 25 (noting the lack of multiracial chassifi-
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because of the way race is socially constructed, the offspring of a
mixed union would be viewed as Black."'8 Indeed, as long as
there are visible traces of melanin in a person's skin that allows one
to draw the conclusion that an ancestor of the individual was Black,
the individual will be identified as a Black person. 189
The fact that a mixed-union offspring whose physical appearance
or phenotype indicates that an ancestor was or is a nonwhite is
racially categorized according to the race of the nonwhite ancestor
can perhaps be explained by a number of related theories having to
do with protecting "whiteness" as a property right.190 Those
theories have merit. The fact that "whiteness" is protected as a
valuable property right, however, does not explain why other racial
classifications or categories have not developed to fill the gap to
identify those who are the products of mixed unions.
191
This Part represents an attempt to explicate briefly how the
construction of race in American society has resulted in a biracial
dichotomy and to explore tentative solutions to the problems
presented by this dichotomy. In particular, I argue that race as
socially constructed in American society is at its most effective when
cations in the present U.S. legal system).
"s Of course, this assumes that there is a sufficient population of offspring of
mixed-race couples to matter. Believe it or not, at one time it was presumed (and
used to support antimiscegenation statutes) that certain offspring of mixed-race
couples could not produce children:
It is stated as a well authenticated fact that if the issue of a black man and
a white woman, and a white man and a black woman, intermarry, they
cannot possibly have any progeny, and such a fact sufficientlyjustifies those
laws which forbid the intermarriage of blacks and whites, laying out of view
other sufficient ground for such enactments.
State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883).
1s9 The absence of melanin in a person's skin does not, of course, mean that the
person has no Black ancestors. Indeed, there are many individuals who consider
themselves Black, but because of their light pigmentation are viewed by others as
white, and therefore may "pass" for white in American society. See supra notes 178-81
and accompanying text (discussing the phenomenon of passing).
19 See Harris, supra note 8, at 1716-21, 1758-61 (discussing past and present
incentives to maintain racial purity in an attempt to secure the exclusive benefits of
"whiteness"); supra part III (postulating that attempts by poor whites to cling to their
property right in whiteness might partially explain why segregation is increasing
among the poor despite their limited housing options).
191 In other societies, mixed-race children are treated quite differently. The one
drop of blood rule that classifies the offspring of a Black and white as Black seems
to be almost unique to the United States. See DAVIS, supra note 159, at 81-122
(describing the variety of ways in which other societies classify mixed-race peoples,
and contrasting these variations with the one drop rule's automatic assignment of the
social status occupied by Blacks to persons with any Black ancestry).
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it can be manipulated to maintain a duality that entrenches the
notion of "otherness" that results from a baseline of white racial
purity. I contend that race and racialism (the tendency for each
significant issue facing our society to be transformed into one
involving race) in American society will never be eliminated or
reduced until the manner in which race is categorized is radically
altered to take into account the products of mixed unions in a way
that recognizes their unique ethnicity and heritage.
9 2
A. Destabilizing Racial Categories
By viewing our racial categories as simply Black and white, with
white viewed as normal or good and Black viewed as different or
other (and perhaps malevolently by some as bad or less than good),
whites and Blacks have relied on supposedly stable categories that
benefit whites at the expense of persons of color. Whites have been
able to relegate all persons of color to subordinate status by
reference to what they are not: white. Whiteness then becomes the
defining, driving category by which others are measured. Moreover,
whiteness is what I characterize as a regressive biological trait
because it is defined as the absence of Black or "Blackness"; as a
result, white purity is maintained when whites produce descendants
with other whites. This has the effect of maintaining white racial
identity and enforcing self-imposed segregation, such that whites
socialize and interact only with other whites.
The attainment of the color-blind society cannot and will not
occur if the current dichotomous typology of race continues to
exist. In order to break down this dichotomy and deconstruct race
as a harmful categorization, I contend that society should embrace,
as a transitory vehicle, multiple racial categories that expressly
recognize and acknowledge products of mixed-race unions. I posit
that this will have the effect of destroying the Black/white dichoto-
my. As currently constructed, race is largely essentialistic and
harmful. By developing a multiplicity of racial categories, race will
ultimately be reduced to a meaningless category, as it should be.
I disagree, then, with others who believe that Blacks need to
maintain the current mode of racial typology in order to harness
My model is the treatment of race in Hawaii in which race and color are largely
irrelevant. See id. at 112-13. For further discussion of the treatment of race in
Hawaii, seeJohnson, supra note 24, at 20-21 (discussing how the one drop rule does
not operate in Hawaii as it does elsewhere in the United States because of that state's
history, population mix, and cultural norms).
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and maintain their political strength.' 3 I conclude that although
that particular goal may be accomplished in the short term, it comes
at a detrimental, long-term cost. The express adoption of multi-
racial categories, however, is for the long-term benefit of elimi-
nating race and racism in this society. In the short term, alliances
must be made across these multiracial boundaries in order to main-
tain and increase political strength. This short-term strategy of
maintaining and perfecting alliances seems to be quite attainable
given the commonality of interests that cut across these multiracial
lines.
What is revealing about the biracial composition of American
society is how it elevates whiteness, or race, over ethnicity as a
unifying feature of the dominant group in American society. At the
same time, it constrains all those who are not purely white, either
visibly, through ancestry, or both, to a subordinate status as a
minority. In reality, of course, no majority group exists. Whiteness,
as a racial category, becomes important and defining in this society
for two reasons. First, a substantial percentage of the population is
not white-they are Black or some racial identification other than
white." 4 It is only the existence of Blacks and this country's
historical treatment of Blacks that makes whiteness so defining and
important. Second, this country's original (and to a lesser degree,
continuing) status as a melting pot for immigrants from Europe,
coupled with its democratic ideals, has created a hodgepodge not
only of races, but also of ethnic heterogeneity. This ethnic
heterogeneity, if allowed to flourish, may have the effect of
destabilizing whiteness as a property right in the same way that a
multiracial taxonomy does. If whiteness and Blackness are removed
as identifiers, and ethnicity substituted, America looks remarkably
diverse and pluralistic, with no one group dominating over any
other group.
Race is the factor that masks the diversity that is American
ethnic make-up. Whites are able to minimize and view as secondary
their ethnicity due to the presence and opposite definition of
9 ' The U.S. Census Bureau announced plans for 1996 to offer "multiracial" as an
option in indicatingone's race, but minority groups responded negatively. See Hanna
Rosin, Boxed in, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 1994, at 12 ("The prospect that the new
category would dilute their statistical strength had [minority groups] clamoring in
defense of the status quo.").
" According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994, in 1992
approximately 42,170,000 out of a total of 255,082,000 Americans were not white.
See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 144, at 17.
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Blacks. White only has meaning when Blacks are prevalent in
society. 195 Thus, the biracial classification or taxonomy not only
has the effect of monolithizing Blacks and the Black experience, it
has the related effect of unifying whites and submerging ethnic
differences that, if recognized, would deconstruct and destroy
racism's base elements-a sense of identity of "us" versus "them."
Were these ethnic differences recognized, ethnic identity would
become important for a sense of self.
What is puzzling and revealing is the way ethnicity functions in
our society to differentiate whites into various subgroups, whereas
Blacks apparently either lack ethnicity or their ethnicity is so
correlated with race that the two are coterminous and indistinguish-
able. Race and ethnicity are one when the individual is an Ameri-
can Black.1
96
If ethnicity is correlated with a country of national origin,
197
then part of what slavery apparently accomplished, through its erad-
ication of the slave's individual identity as an equal or a person and
its lack of respect for that slave's heritage and country of origin, is
the obliteration of the ethnicity of the descendants of those original
slaves. The obliteration of the slave's geographic or tribal identity,
which today could constitute ethnicity, was further hastened by
forced miscegenation, creating what some may characterize as an
indigenous race in the United States that came into being only as a
byproduct of slavery.19
8
"' Whether this society would be riven by ethnic strife, d la the former Yugoslavia,
if the United States did not have a significant Black population is beyond the scope
of this Article. It is nevertheless interesting to speculate about this issue. I come to
the conclusion that no such strife would exist because of the relative historical youth
of this country and the fact that, to some degree, with the exception of Native
Americans, all ethnic groups are immigrant groups. I do believe, however, that ethnic
tensions would be exacerbated.
" I highlight here American Black because of the plausible assertion that Blacks
from other countries are treated differently, that is, better than American Blacks.
That fact may reflect the reality that foreign-born Blacks, like white Americans, may
have an ethnic identity based on their nationality that American Blacks do not have.
For further discussion of this issue, seeJohnson, supra note 24, at 32 n.69 (describing
how stereotypes and racism against American Blacks are not only race based, but
culturally and environmentally based as well).
'
97 
See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980s, at 15 (1986) ("Race was but one of a number
of determinants of ethnic group identity or ethnicity. Ethnicity itself was understood
as the result of a group formation process based on culture and descent.").
'9" See Johnson, supra note 5, at 1415 (discussing the theory that Black Americans
represent a new ethnic group indigenous to North America similar to the Native
Americans but dissimilar because they were forcibly brought here and created here
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Consequently, society has constructed a biracial taxonomy to
differentiate between whites and Blacks, while simultaneously
constructing ethnicity as a differentiating classificatory scheme from
which Blacks are excluded. Differences that matter among whites
are relegated to an inconsequential status among Blacks. As
Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue:
In fact, with rare exceptions, ethnicity theory isn't very interested
in ethnicity among blacks. The ethnicity approach views blacks as
one ethnic group among others. It does not consider national
origin, religion, language, or cultural differences among blacks, as
it does among whites, as sources of ethnicity.... There is, in fact,
a subtly racist element in this substitution-in which whites are
seen as variegated in terms of group identities, but blacks "all look
alike."'99
For Blacks, therefore, ethnicity is conflated with race. This
conflation causes all Blacks to be viewed as belonging to the same
ethnic group, whether their ancestors are from the Ibo tribe in
Nigeria or the Banta people who populate Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Similarly, if "intermediary" ancestors of today's Blacks originated in
Brazil or an island in the Caribbean, that factor too is deemed
irrelevant. In addition, to the extent Blacks have settled in different
regions and have undertaken different lifestyles, those differences
have been minimized or subsumed by racial identification of Blacks
qua Black. This overriding tendency to treat race as a unifying
characteristic negates any differences that might exist or develop
between Blacks based either on ancestors' point of origin or current
geographic location.
What is problematic about this conflation is what it portends for
the way whites and Blacks are viewed in this society and interpreted
by others. Ethnicity is not only something that is learned and inter-
nalized as a member of a group; it is also a characteristic or trait
that must be communicated from the ethnic group member to the
individual doing the categorization. ° In this respect, ethnicity is
rather than being found and separated from their dominion over the land).
199 OMI & WINANT, supra note 197, at 23.
2'00 For a discussion of why this is so, except perhaps on the margin where ethnic
identity is visible and serves a function similar to that of race, see Johnson, supra note
24. In that article, I argue that, with rare exceptions, ethnicity is communicated or
learned through interaction between parties because most ethnic groups in the
United States trace their ancestry to Northern Europe and thus are largely
indistinguishable by appearance or phenotype. The person on the margin, whose
ethnicity is visible and therefore not merely communicated or learned, usually most
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different from race because race is something that is typically visibly
ascertainable and recognizable. More importantly, because ethnicity
is something that is learned and communicated, it is something that
can be changed and concealed or disguised. Race, on the contrary,
because of its visible and instantaneous recognition, cannot so easily
be manipulated.2"'
Moreover, because of the pliability of ethnic classification,
ethnicity is largely something that can be embraced, ignored, or
changed at the whim of the individual. Ethnic identification does
not preclude assimilation and passing into larger white society.
resembles the stereotypes associated with the particular ethnic group. For example,
a very large man with fair skin, blue eyes, and blond hair may correctly-but not
always-be identified as German or Teutonic.
20' The phenomenon of "passing," seesupra notes 178-81, demonstrates the futility
of racial classificatory schemes premised on biologic arguments and illustrates the
strength of the claim that it is ethnicity and not race that should govern categoriza-
tion.
One may look white and be Black, whereas conversely one may look Black and
be white. This last phrase-that one may look Black and be white-caused me to pause
as I wrote it. Although it is easy to conceive of situations where Blacks have passed
for whites, it is hard to think of any rational basis why someone would look Black and
be white. But clearly there are individuals who are the products of two visibly white
parents but who, because of the ancestry of their parents (one parent had, for
example, a Black grandmother and unbeknownst to her, her mother passed as white
and never informed the daughter), are visibly Black. The hesitancy I had in writing
the phrase "one may look Black and be white" has, I think, to do with the way that
we consider whiteness as superior, as a property right that defines Blackness as
inferior. See supra part III. We can think of increasingly lighter-hued peregrinations
of Black parents producing lighter (what some perceive to be better) children. For
some that represents the optimal strategy in marriage-marrying to lighten one's
children's skin color. I have characterized this phenomenon as "color-consciousness."
SeeJohnson, supra note 24, at 28-34 (describing how Blacks, by imposing their own
scheme of "color-consciousness" have internalized their own subordinated position
and elevated whiteness to a property right). Others have referred to it as "colorism."
Itabari Njeri, Sushi and Grits: Ethnic Identity and Conflict in a Newly Multicultured
America, in LURE AND LOATHING, supra note 8, at 13, 16 (citing the work of Alice
Walker).
But it is hard to fathom white parents producing Black children. That has the
impact and effect of destroying the alleged purity that is whiteness. If whiteness can
beget Blackness, how then is whiteness defined? The entire dichotomy of racial
classification disappears. It would not surprise me, then, that the reason that one
does not hear of instances in which two visibly white parents beget a visibly Black
child is that such a child is cosmetically altered in some fashion to achieve visible
whiteness or the mother (or the father as the case may be) is reclassified as Black to
explain the presence of the Black child. In this case, the production of the Black
child has the odd and probably unintended effect of causing the parent to be
reclassified so as to conform to our social construction of race, in which Blacks can
aspire to whiteness and perhaps ultimately produce it, but whites cannot produce
Blackness.
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Thus, an Italian or a Polish person may have her name voluntarily
or involuntarily anglicized so as to obscure her ethnic origins. That
individual could in certain contexts choose to proclaim, minimize,
or repudiate her ethnic heritage; racial identification cannot be
manipulated in this way. Race, like gender, is (to a large extent)
truly immutable, whereas ethnicity is more chameleon-like and
changeable. As a result, ethnicity-sometimes something to be
proud of and other times something to run from-is not as stigma-
tizing as race.
If race functioned as ethnicity currently functions in our society,
racism and the societal ills it creates would not exist. Furthermore,
the negative attributions associated with being Black or Black-
ness 2 in this society could not exist to any significant degree
because racial identifications would not be made. Consequently, if
race acted as ethnicity, race would be a relatively harmless category.
Suffice it to say, my basic contention is that racial identification
must be destabilized and made fluid akin to ethnic categories.
20 3
By destabilizing racial classification through first recognizing a racial
category denominated as "other," it is hoped that the boundaries of
racial identification will dissolve, and ethnic identity, with its
associated positive attributes, will be recognized as the primary
paradigm by which to identify and classify individuals. Moving from
the visual (racial identification) to the learned (ethnic identification)
will have positive results, but not without the costs associated with
the transition from a world in which all persons who are not white
are categorized as Black or other.
20 4
B. Reviving Antidiscrimination Law Through Destabilization
As noted above, I presume that both what I characterize as
"market" and "interventionist" models fail to adequately correct and
address the issues raised by housing discrimination. Yet I agree that
discrimination in both housing and employment are normatively
22 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
20 Elsewhere I argue that the answer lies in destabilizing the trademark of Black
and Blackness, which will have the effect of destabilizing racial identification and
permitting ethnic identification to take hold with all of the attendant benefits. That
is the subject of another article and cannot be fully explored herein. SeeJohnson,
supra note 24, at 49-51 (describing how destabilization of the trademark of Blackness
can weaken negative perceptions and improve positive perceptions of Blacks).
204 As noted previously, many Blacks have objected to the development of a
multiracial box on the census form because it allegedly minimizes the heretofore
monolithic Black political power. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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wrong from both a moral perspective 20 5 and an economic perspec-
tive. 20 6 The moral perspective is intuitively easier to grasp and
descriptively much harder to allege (indeed, it requires the sort of
exegesis that expert philosophers must make and thus lies beyond
the scope of this Article).
The less accessible, and perhaps more concrete, argument that
discrimination in housing is inefficient and should therefore be the
subject of regulation has been concisely made:
By analogy to theft, the benefit from prohibiting a form of
discrimination is to prevent the waste of resources invested in such
discrimination as a means of acquiring (confiscating) status. When
theft is prohibited, the primary alternative by which the former
thief can make material gains is ... to engage in productive
activity. The argument for laws prohibiting subordination as a
means of acquiring status is exactly parallel: such laws induce
people to switch to socially productive, or at least socially benign,
means of acquiring status (either at the individual or group
level) .... The same argument can be made for prohibiting private
discrimination in certain key areas, beginning, for example, with
employment and housing.... Effectively prohibiting employment
and housing discrimination deprives whites of their most produc-
tive private means of subordination, thereby lowering the
resources invested in this wasteful confiscatory activity.
2 7
Moreover, antidiscrimination laws result in less discrimination
by encouraging integration among different groups. When whites
and Blacks reside and work in integrated environments, "cross-
membership" in groups will be fostered. That cross-membership,
or what I characterize as multiple-membership in groups, will
inevitably lead to a lessening of discrimination. °8
What has been ignored to date are the benefits that would ensue
if group membership itself were destabilized. It stands to reason
that if group identity were destabilized so as either to increase the
number and types of cross-memberships through the recognition of
multiracial categories209 or to make group membership indetermi-
205 See RAWLS, supra note 125, at 75 (arguing that the'"higher expectations of
those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which
improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society").2 See supra parts II.A-D.
207 McAdams, supra note 21, at 105-06 (footnotes omitted).
21 See id. at 106-07 (discussing how "cross-membership" will eliminate economic
incentives to subordinate members of other groups).
209 To the extent that racial identification remains stable, having multiracial groups
will increase cross-membership in groups. Both whites and Blacks will have to lessen
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nate, discrimination aimed at producing group status would de-
crease.210  What is important to recognize at this point is that
antidiscrimination law will remain an ineffective tool for combating
inefficient and morally impermissible racial discrimination in
housing if the law is based on dichotomous and inconsistent
premises. The law cannot advocate an antidiscrimination principle
in which race and racial identification are said to be irrelevant and
at the same time explicitly promote racial classifications that
produce group status or esteem through fixed racial identities. The
inevitable result is dissonance between the stated ideal and the
practical reality.
CONCLUSION
The standard explanations given for why Blacks find themselves
in ghettos only partially explain the patterns of segregation in
American society. Thus, although race and poverty are clearly
causative factors leading to the creation and maintenance of ghettos
in American society, these factors, alone and in harmony (at least as
traditionally viewed in harmony), do not explain the total absence
of integration among the poor. Poverty alone cannot explain why
Blacks and whites inhabit separate neighborhoods because of the
significant overlap of white and Black poor. Race alone cannot
explain why poor whites are so averse to living in integrated
neighborhoods when their impoverished state should limit their
choices. More importantly, the experience of other minority and
immigrant groups belies the notion that race and racism play a
significant role in maintaining segregated neighborhoods.
To paraphrase Cornel West, race, unfortunately, continues to
matter in American society.211 The biracial categorization of race
their discrimination against the other group because such discrimination, when
applied to a member of a multiracial group, will necessarily result in discrimination
against their own favored group. The offspring of a Black-white union will not
discriminate against either Blacks or whites because to do so would lower that
individual's self-esteem. At the very least, it would result in self-abnegation.
210 The benefits and costs of the recognition of multiple racial categories and the
destabilization of current group categories is the subject of yet another article. See
Johnson, supra note 24, at 24-27 (attempting to explicate the reasons why race in
American society has been constructed as a biracial, Black/white dichotomy).
21 See, e.g., West, supra note 30 (1993) (arguing that a serious discussion of race
in America must begin not with the problems of black people but with the flaws of
American society-flaws rooted in historic inequalities and longstanding cultural
stereotypes-and analyzing issues such as the new black conservatism, black-Jewish
relations, and myths about black sexuality).
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is a relic of an antebellum system of slavery that should have been
discarded long ago, when slavery itself was abolished. The dichoto-
mous classification of race, however, has been reinforced in
American society for over three centuries. This biracial categoriza-
tion continues to serve the same role that it did in slavery-to mark
and define those who were part of the dominant, privileged class,
while branding those who are subordinate and on the bottom. As
long as this biracial marking continues to occur, progress in race
relations, including housing, will be impeded.
Consequently, I contend that the exclusivity of the two marks of
"white" and "Black" should be deconstructed and destroyed. It is
the intersection of race and poverty that creates a property right in
whiteness for poor whites that consigns Blacks to segregated
ghettos. Moreover, because we no longer wage a War on Poverty
that can or will be used to raise both poor whites and Blacks to a
socioeconomic level in which whiteness as a property right is
irrelevant, the only viable way to attack segregation is by attacking
the stable classifications of race.
Notwithstanding a wealth of scientific and other data that proves
that there is no such thing as a "white" race or a "Black" race,
American society and law perpetuates the social construction of
such categories by recognizing them as fixed and stable. My
tentative conclusion is that the old categories, given the baggage
they carry, must be destabilized and discarded. In their place, I
contend we should create a society in which multiracial categories
are encouraged and recognized. That will reduce the importance
of racial identification and racism in our society. Unfortunately, it
may have the short-term effect of reducing the political strengths of
the currently constructed racial groups and creating a society in
which racial categories soon become irrelevant.212 A world with-
out race, or at least a biracial conception of race, is frightening to
some and rightfully so. The unknown always represents a challenge,
a challenge that we should begin to analyze and address.
212 But cf. Rosin, supra note 193, at 14. Despite the potential gains in accuracy a
multiracial census category could achieve, "Census statisticians claim it is too broad
to be useful. 'Who's in there? You could fit all of the U.S. in that category,' says
Juanita Tama Lott, a Census consultant. 'In order to do statistical analysis we have
to have mutually exclusive categories.'" Id.
